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Abstract
There are two major views that explain or try to give an answer to the question ‘why did 
the US wage war on Iraq in 1991’. Some scholars believe that the US waged its war for 
iv
geopolitical reasons that aimed at dominating the Middle East after the US was left alone 
with  the  collapse  of  the  USSR.  Others  believe  that  in  waging this  war  the  US  was 
responding to societal factors. These two views that try to explain the proposed question 
can be seen to reflect two theories in international relations; realism vs. liberalism.
In the study proposed here, an attempt will be carried out to tackle the question: Why did 
the US wage war  on Iraq in 1991 through presenting  a  debate  between the different 
authors  that  represent  the  two  schools  of  thought,  realism  and  liberalism.  More 
importantly, it will test which of the two theories happens to provide better explanations 
and predictions in this particular case study. An attempt will also be taken to show the 
faults (if any) in both theories. 
صخلم
v
 هناك رأيان رئيسان يحاولن ايجاد تفسير أو الجابة عن السؤال "لماذا شنت الوليات المتحدة المريكية الحرب علللى
 ؟" يعتقد بعض العلماء بأن الوليات المتحدة شنت حربها هذه لسلباب جيوسياسلية هلدفت السليطرة1991العراق عام 
 على الشرق الوسط بعد أن أصبحت الوليات المتحدة القطب الوحد بعلد إنهيلار التحلاد السلوفييتي. ويعتقلد البعلض
 الخرين بأن الوليات المتحدة بشنها هذه الحرب كلانت تسلتجيب لضلغوطات إجتماعيلة. هلذان الرأيلان الللذان حلاول
الجابة عن السؤال المقترح، يمكن أن ينظر إليهما كإنعكاس لنظريتين في العلقات الدولية؛ الواقعية ضد الليبيرالية.
 1991هذه الدراسة المقترحة هي عبارة عن محاولة لمعرفة أسباب شن الوليلات المتحلدة الحلرب عللى العلراق علام 
 وذلك من خلل عرض لمناقشة الموضوع من قبل مؤلفين مختلفين يمثلون المدرستين الفكريتين؛ الواقعية والليبيراليللة.
 والهم من ذلك سوف تختبر هذه الدراسة أ ّيا من النظريتين حدث وأن قدمت تفسيرات وتنبؤات أفضل بالنسلبة لدراسلة
الحال هذه. وكذلك ستجري محاولة لتبيان نقاط الضعف، إن وجدت، في كل من النظريتين.
stnetnoC fo elbaT
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IIntroduction
In 1990, Saddam started to pose his power in the Gulf. He invaded Kuwait and the US 
waged its war on Iraq in 1991. 
But  why did  the  US respond by waging war  instead  of  adopting  a  more  diplomatic 
solution? While reviewing some of the literature written on the subject, it was clear that 
the authors were applying different theories in international relations. The first group of 
these authors focuses on the changes in the international system and how that affected the 
decision  of  the  US  to  go  to  war.  Some  believe  “that  1989  brought  about  security 
conditions different from those of the Cold War and that this had an impact on patterns of 
conflict and cooperation in the Middle East” (Hansen 1). Thus, “In the case of Operation 
Desert Storm, the new alignment patterns had distinctly unipolar characteristics as well: 
the parties flocked around the US, and they carried out the US-defined objectives in a 
US-led coalition even when it came to war” (Hansen 160). 
The second group of authors focuses on the US domestic societal structure and internal 
problems as part of a transnational societal context as the driving force in the US decision 
to go to war. For example, some believe that the US economy  of “A huge budget deficit, 
a  high  trade  deficit,  a  relatively  weak  dollar,  a  fairly  high  unemployment  rate,  an 
increasing number of institutions and corporations forced into bankruptcy, and a stagnant 
productivity and investment…” (Rabie 65) is the underlying motivator for the US to go 
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into war outside. This view is also shared by others such as Alan Freeman who also 
believes  that  the  war  was  fought  against  an  “economic  background”  (Freeman  158). 
Others believe in the role played by certain lobby groups towards this end. Whereas, a 
third liberalist argument which was presented by some authors indicate that this war was 
a war done by George Bush in an attempt to increase the polls in his reelection campaign. 
The first group represents the realist school of thought. Realism focuses on the world 
system that is “formed and maintained on a principle of self-help that applies to the units” 
(Waltz 91). First, realism perceives states as being major actors. States are assumed to be 
both unitary and rational. States are unitary in the sense that despite the fact that states are 
composed of different institutions still the state speaks in one voice. Furthermore, states 
are rational in the sense that whatever decisions or actions they take; these actions are 
based on a  deep consideration  of all  the available  alternatives  in order to arrive at  a 
certain goal. Second, the state’s primary goal is to achieve national security. In order to 
achieve  that  goal  or  to  arrive  at  any other  goal,  states  work towards  increasing  their 
power capabilities whether military or economic (Viotti and Kauppi 35-37). “Power is 
estimated by comparing the capabilities of a number of units” (Waltz 98). Third, states 
try to enhance and maximize their capabilities as they function in a world system that is 
“decentralized and anarchic” (Waltz 88). Fourth, “the structure of a system changes in the 
distribution of capabilities across the system’s units” (Waltz 97). Finally, realists assume 
that “Among states, the state of nature is a state of war” (Waltz 102).   
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On  the  other  hand,  the  second  group  represents  the  liberalist  school  of  thought  in 
international  relations.  Liberalist  focus  on  individual  actors  rather  than  on  the 
international system in trying to explain a certain act. “Liberal IR theory elaborates the 
insight  that  state-society  relations-  the  relationship  of  states  to  the  domestic  and 
transnational social context in which they are embedded- have a fundamental impact on 
state behavior in world politics"(Moravcsik 513). For Liberalists “state preferences, that 
is,  the  fundamental  social  purposes  underlying  the  strategic  calculations  of 
governments…matters most in world politics” (Moravcsik 513).
In this study, an attempt will be carried out to tackle the question: Why did the US wage 
war on Iraq in 1991 through relying on two famous theories of international relations; 
Realism and Liberalism and try to see how these theories can be translated into practice 
basically  through  applying  them  to  the  case  study  of  the  US  war  in  Iraq  (1991). 
Furthermore, I want to test how each theory explains the research question proposed here 
in order to reach at an answer to the research question. More importantly, I would test 
which of the theories happen to provide us with better explanations and predictions in this 
particular case study. An attempt will also be taken to show the faults (if any) in both 
theories. 
Research Methodology and General Structure:
This study will adopt the theory based approach. It will mainly rely on two theoreticians; 
Waltz  and Moravcsik that speak out for two major theories of international relations; 
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Realism and Liberalism respectively.  It will show how these theories were applied by 
different scholars in explaining the present case study. This approach is used in order to 
answer the research question of why the US waged war on Iraq in 1991.
The First Chapter will present both theories through relying on the protagonist of each, 
Waltz vs. Moravcsik. This chapter will present the main assumptions of each theory. It 
will also take a step further and present a comparison between the two theories in order to 
reach at a better understanding of each.
The Second Chapter will present a general brief history of the Gulf War. 
The Third Chapter will make use of the main assumptions of the two theories (in chapter 
I) to arrive at the main hypotheses to be tested. It will also show what these assumptions 
expect  from the case study.  The theory based hypotheses  arrived at,  in this  case,  are 
realist vs. liberalist hypotheses.
 
The Fourth Chapter will test the realist hypotheses through reading different scholars that 
adopted the realist theory in explaining the case study. 
The Fifth Chapter will test the liberalist  hypotheses through reading different scholars 
that adopted the liberalist theory in explaining the case study.     
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A conclusion is expected to be reached at based on the outlined five chapters and the 
results of testing the different hypotheses. This paper should be able to reach at an answer 
to the research question.
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Chapter One
II. Theoretical Background
II.1. Realism
Realism is “a theory of international politics” (Morgenthau 3). It believes that the world 
is an “imperfect” place and draws this back to the “forces inherent in human nature” 
(Morgenthau 3). Realism is said to be pessimistic in the sense that it views the human 
nature in a pessimistic way. “The root of all evil is man”. (Waltz 3) 
Realism as a theory is based on assumptions. According to Keohane, political realism is 
based on three main assumptions “(1) states (or city-states) are the key units of action; (2) 
they seek power, either as an end in itself  or as a means to other ends; and (3) they 
behave in ways that are, by and large, rational, and therefore comprehensible to outsiders 
in rational terms” (7). According to Giplin, these assumptions are ordered in a different 
way. The first assumes that the nature of international affairs is conflictual. Anarchy is 
the prevailing state. The second assumes that the essence of social reality is the group that 
are  named  “nation-states”  and  that  are  always  in  conflict  over  the  distribution  of 
resources.  The  third  assumes  that  in  political  life,  power  and  security  are  the  most 
important things (Gilpin 304-305). 
One of the most important pillars of realism is Waltz  Theory of International Politics  
(1979). In this work “Waltz starts with the international system and its structural features 
in order to explain certain aspects of the behavior of individual states” (Gilpin 302).
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Realism focuses on the system. In this case, international politics is always a result of 
factors in the international system. To Waltz “A system is composed of a structure of 
interacting  units”  (Waltz  79).  Waltz  leaves  aside  the  social  and  economic  forces 
operating in the state as well as its form of government or who is its leader. In defining 
the structure, Waltz does not concentrate on “how units relate with one another (how they 
interact) and concentrates...on how they stand in relation to one another (how they are 
arranged or positioned)” (80). Reaching at a simple definition of what the realist theory 
should focus on in its study and interpretation of international relations, Waltz defines the 
structure “by the arrangement of its parts” (80). 
Starting  by  describing  the  domestic  structure,  he  then  moves  to  draw his  theory  on 
international relations. The Domestic structure is defined “first, according to the principle 
by which it is ordered; second, by specification of the functions of formally differentiated 
units; and third, by the distribution of capabilities across those units”  (82). 
Taking the first definition of the domestic structure, Waltz sees the order in which the 
parts  at  the  domestic  level  are  ordered  to  be  hierarchal  and  centralized;  some  units 
command  while  others  obey.  In  contrast,  the  international  system  is  seen  to  be 
“decentralized  and anarchic”  (88).  All  units  are  said to  be equal  in  the absence of  a 
government. “International  political  systems,…,  are  formed  by  the  coaction  of  self 
regarding units” (91). These units “are defined in terms of the primary political units of 
an era, be they city states, empires, or nations” (91). The international system is “formed 
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and maintained on a principle of self-help that applies to the units,” (91).  Realists assume 
that states seek survival in a system where their security is not guaranteed (92). Units 
interact  together and “Out of the interactions…they develop structures that  reward or 
punish behavior that conforms more or less nearly to what is required of one who wishes 
to succeed in the system” (92). Waltz proceeds to say that “States are the units whose 
interactions form the structure of international political systems” (95). States decide on 
ways and strategies to deal with their external and internal problems they sometimes ask 
for help from other states and in turn indulge themselves in external commitments that 
limit their freedom and constrain them. 
Taking the second definition Waltz sees the domestic system to be composed of units that 
differ in their function. In contrast in the international system states are said to be alike 
“in the tasks that they face, though not in their abilities to perform them. The differences 
are of capability, not of function” (96). All states are involved in economic regulations, 
health, education ect. but some states are more powerful than others.  
In studying the third definition, units in the domestic system differ in their function as 
well  as  capabilities.  In  the  international  system  realists  focus  on  the  distribution  of 
capabilities  among  states.  The  form  of  state  whether  democratic,  authoritarian, 
revolutionary, or what so ever is not of importance to realists what matters is the state’s 
power. A state’s power is measured by its capabilities and power in this sense is relative 
between states. The distribution of power or capabilities among the states can alter the 
structure of the system. A system is said to be bipolar if two states happen to posses the 
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greatest  capabilities.  Relationships  among  states  such  as  alliances  do  not  define  the 
structure of the international system but capabilities do (97-99).
Realists assume that among states, the state of nature is that of war. And in order for a 
state to survive this system it  should work towards enhancing its military capabilities 
(102). Force prevails in an anarchic international system. In order to discuss the anarchic 
international system Waltz contradicts it with the ‘hierarchic’ system that prevails at the 
unit level. Realists differentiate between anarchy and hierarchy as two terms that show 
the organization of a system. In an anarchic world system states are alike functionally but 
differ in their capabilities. They tend to ‘coact’ rather than cooperate in this system that is 
characterized to be a ‘self help system’. In this ‘self help system’, “A state worries about 
a division of possible gains that may favor others more than itself” (106). This system 
limits  cooperation  between states  as  each  state  continues  to  fear  the  other  states  and 
continues to care for its survival. Instead, states would rather “seek to control what they 
depend on or to lessen the extent of their dependency” (106). On the other hand, in a 
hierarchic system units are different and they tend to ‘interact’ rather than ‘coact’ (104-
106).
Realists believe in structures; “Structures cause actions to have consequences they were 
not  intended to  have” (107).  Structures  can  only be  changed through changes  in  the 
distribution of capabilities (108). Within this structure states are constrained to take care 
of themselves in a rational way (109). Nonetheless, rational thinking that is limited to 
state interests does not always produce a wanted result. When each state cares for its own 
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being  neither  thinks  for  the  well  being  of  the  system  in  the  absence  of  a  world 
government (109).    
The state’s primary goal is to achieve national security. States seek to balance the power 
of other states in order to survive the self-help system. “The historically most important 
manifestation of the balance of power, however, is to be found not in the equilibrium of 
two isolated nations but in the relations between one nation or alliance of nations and 
another alliance” (Morgenthau 181). States enter into alliances in what Waltz refers to as 
“Balance-of-power  politics”.  According  to  Waltz  “Balance-of-power  politics  prevail 
wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it 
be populated by units wishing to survive” (121). While first portraying the international 
system  as  an  ‘anarchic’  system  that  is  “horizontal,  decentralized,  homogeneous, 
undirected,  and  mutually  adaptive”  (113)  as  opposed  to  the  national  system  that  is 
“hierarchic, vertical, centralized, heterogeneous, directed, and contrived” (113) and that 
its states are seeking survival in a self-help system, he sets the concept of ‘balance of 
power’ as a theory of international relations (117). 
So for realists, the main actors are states that seek to preserve their security in a self-help 
system characterized by anarchy. States live in a state of war each trying to enhance its 
power where power refers to the capabilities a state possesses in contrast to other states or 
as Morgenthau had put it  “When we speak of power, we mean man’s control over the 
minds and actions of other men. By political power we refer to the mutual relations of 
control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at 
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large” (Morgenthau 28).  States wish to limit  the capabilities of others in a zero-sum 
game in order to preserve their survival and security. States also tend to flock together in 
the form of alliances so as to balance a state or other powerful states. The structure of the 
international system is what counts according to realists cause it constrains and limits the 
actions of states. States have no choice but to care for their own existence and interests. 
So  mainly,  international  politics  is  the  result  of  factors  in  the  international  system 
basically the distribution of power capabilities among the main units in the international 
system which are the states.  
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II. 2. Liberalism
According  to  Doyle,  liberal  tradition  goes  back  to  Schumpeter’s  liberal  pacifism, 
Machiavelli’s liberal imperialism, and Kant’s liberal internationalism (1151). The term 
liberal “resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain 
characteristics- for example, individual freedom, political participation, private property, 
and equality of opportunity” (Doyle 1152). Schumpeter’s liberal pacifism assumes that 
with the development of capitalism and democracy peace will prevail and imperialism 
would disappear. He states that capitalist democracy stands “against the use of military 
force and for peaceful arrangements, even when the balance of pecuniary advantages is 
clearly on the side of war which, under modern circumstances,  is not in general very 
likely” (Schumpeter 128). Machiavelli gives the opposite view of Schumpeter. He argues 
that  republics  are  not  pacifistic;  they  constitute  the  best  form of  imperial  expansion 
(Doyle 1154). Kant’s contribution to liberalism lies in his book Perpetual Peace written in 
1795. In this work, Kant assumes that peace will be attained once nations accept the three 
‘Definitive Articles’. The first article states that “The civil constitution of each state shall 
be republican” (Kant 120). The second states that “The law of nations shall be founded 
on a federation of free states” (Kant 128). And the third, which introduces the concept of 
cosmopolitan  right,  states  that  “The rights  of  men,  as  citizens  of  the world,  shall  be 
limited to the conditions of universal hospitality” (Kant 137).  Kant’s main prediction is 
that humans are free and rational in making their choices and that out of fear, force, and 
advantages we as humans opt for actions that lead to perpetual peace (Doyle 1159). 
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Based on this tradition of liberal theory, Andrew Moravcsik claims that he “reformulates 
liberal  international  relations  (IR)  theory  in  a  nonideological  and  nonutopian  form 
appropriate to empirical  social  science” (Moravcsik 513). He does this in response to 
criticism  posed  by  different  scholars  including  Robert  Koehane’s  statement  that  “in 
contrast  to  Marxism  and  Realism,  Liberalism  is  not  committed  to  ambitious  and 
parsimonious structural theory” (qtd. In Moravcsik 515). Moravcsik attempt is to rise up 
with  liberalism  to  the  level  of  Waltz  realism  and  of  Koehane’s  Neo-Liberal 
institutionalism. He even goes beyond that and states that “Liberal theory is analytically 
prior to both realism and institutionalism because it defines the conditions under which 
their assumptions hold” (516). 
The  following  section  will  present  the  basic  assumptions  of  the  liberalist  theory  as 
presented by Moravcsik.
Liberalists focus on the societal structure not only on the domestic level but also on a 
transnational level and studies how these factors contribute to shaping politics. “Liberal 
IR theory elaborates the insight that state-society relations- the relationship of states to 
the  domestic  and  transnational  social  context  in  which  they  are  embedded-  have  a 
fundamental  impact  on state  behavior  in  world  politics”  (Moravcsik 513).  Liberalists 
focus on “Societal ideas, interests, and institutions … (as) shaping state preferences, that 
is,  the  fundamental  social  purposes  underlying  the  strategic  calculations  of 
government”…“For liberals, the configuration of state preferences, matters most in world 
politics- not,…, the configuration of capabilities…”(513)
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There  are  three assumptions  in the liberal  theory.  The first  stresses “The Primacy of 
Societal  Actors”  as  it  considers  “The fundamental  actors  in  international  politics  are 
individuals and private groups, who are on the average rational and risk-averse and who 
organize  exchange  and  collective  action  to  promote  differentiated  interests  under 
constraints  imposed by material  scarcity,  conflicting values,  and variations  in societal 
influence” (516). 
This assumption indicates that liberalism perceives politics in a “bottom-up” (517) view. 
Interests of the people and the interest groups at the domestic level reflect itself in the 
formulation of foreign policy of a state. Yet these actors or interest groups do not live in 
harmony but are rather competing with each other due to the ‘material scarcity’, their 
‘conflicting values’, and the ‘inequalities of political power’ distribution (517).
The second assumption deals with “Representation and State Preferences” and states that 
“States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic society, on the 
basis  of whose interests  state officials  define state  preferences  and act  purposively in 
world politics” (518).     
This assumption shows that states are not actors but rather representatives of the social 
actors. The state is the body that transmits the people’s preferences into policy yet not all 
groups  have  the  same  weight  of  representation.  Societal  pressure  can  change a  state 
preference.  State preferences are different from strategies.  State preferences determine 
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the choice of policy or strategy the state adopts. “States do not automatically maximize 
fixed, homogeneous conceptions of security, sovereignty, or wealth per se…they pursue 
particular interpretations and combinations of security, welfare, sovereignty preferred by 
powerful domestic groups enfranchised by representative institutions and practices” (519-
20). 
The  third assumption  deals  with “Interdependence  and the  International  System”  and 
states that “The configuration of state preferences determines state behavior” (520). In 
simple  language,  what  a  state  wants  determines  what  it  does.  “…each state  seeks  to 
realize its distinctive preferences under varying constraints imposed by the preferences of 
other states” (520). Liberalists stress variations in the configuration of state preferences 
while  treating  the  configurations  of  state  capabilities  as  fixed  constraints.  The  link 
between the state preferences and the action of one state or more is referred to by policy 
interdependence. “Policy interdependence is defined here as the set of costs and benefits 
created for foreign societies when dominant social groups in a society seek to realize their 
preferences, that is, the pattern of transnational externalities resulting from attempts to 
pursue national distinctive purposes” (520). This pattern of independent state preference 
constrains state behavior. These patterns are divided into three groups each resulting in a 
different behavior. First, if the preferences of a dominant social group in a state do not 
conflict  with other  state’s  preferences  or even do not matter  to  other  states,  then the 
resulting nature is that of coexistence. Second, if the preferences of a dominating social 
group in one state are conflictual with those in other states and over and above endanger 
the preferences of other states then this results in a ‘zero-sum’ situation which results in 
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disputes.  Third,  if  a  collective  problem exists  then  states  discuss  policy  cooperation. 
Liberals  in  such  case  focus  also  on  the  social  preferences  and  on  domestic  and 
transnational conflicts.
Liberal theory is perceived by Moravcsik to be a systematic theory. In order to prove his 
point,  Moravscsik  speaks  first  of  ‘transnational  societal  interaction’  that  is  the 
responsiveness  of  state  preferences  to  transnational  societal  context  for  example  the 
responsiveness  of  social  demands  to  changes  in  the  global  market  which  makes  this 
theory relevant to changes in the international scene. Second, he claims that by focusing 
on  domestic  theories  of  preferences,  liberalism  is  able  of  explaining  the  systematic 
outcomes of interstate interactions in other words it works at “linking social purpose to 
the symmetry and relative intensity of state preferences” (523).  The state preferences are 
capable not only of determining its foreign policy but also the systematic outcomes as 
‘the  willingness of  governments  to  mobilize  and expend social  resources  for  foreign 
policy purposes’  is  what  matters  most  and not  its  power capabilities.  Liberals  define 
power in terms of “the willingness of states to expend resources or make concessions…a 
function  of  preferences,  not  capabilities”  (523).  This  is  mainly  what  determines 
outcomes. 
There  are  three  variants  of  liberal  theory;  ideational,  commercial,  and  republican. 
Ideational  liberalism  perceives  social  identities  and  values  as  the  determinants  of 
preferences and in the long run of interstate conflicts or cooperation. Social identity refers 
to a set of preferences shared by individuals specifying the right scope and nature of the 
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provision of public goods, which specifies the legitimate domestic structure. Public goods 
refer to geographical  borders, political  decision making processes, and socioeconomic 
regulations. These are not ends but means that are used to reach a desired preference. In 
this sense, foreign policy seeks to realize social views concerning legal borders, political 
institutions, and socioeconomic regulations. Legal borders are set by preferences on the 
‘scope of the ‘nation’’. Borders are said to coincide with the national identities of the 
most powerful social group. Political institutions are perceived differently by different 
groups. The way they are perceived identifies patterns of preferences and thus affects 
international  conflicts  and  cooperation.  For  example  many  wars  were  fought  for 
autocracy  others  are  seen  to  be  fought  for  democracy  and  so  on.  Socioeconomic 
preferences  also  shape  the  interstate  behavior.  For  example,  convergence  of  values 
among the different social groups can lead to cooperation on various issues for example 
the EC (524-528). 
Commercial liberalism “explains the individual and collective behavior of states based on 
the patterns of market incentives facing domestic and transnational economic actors…the 
commercial  liberal  argument  is  broadly functionalist:  Changes  in  the structure  of  the 
domestic  and  global  economy alter  the  costs  and  benefits  of  transnational  economic 
exchange,  creating  pressures  on  domestic  governments  to  facilitate  or  block  such 
exchanges  through  appropriate  foreign  economic  and  security  policies”  (528).    For 
example goveroments may sometimes!use warfare means to control international markets 
and  monopolize  resources.  In  short,  commercial  liberalism  stress  on  the  economic 
preferences of powerful groups in a society.
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Republican liberalism focuses on the means by which domestic institutions combine the 
societal identities and economic interests of social groups and transforms them into what 
is  known to be the state policy.  The most  powerful group is said to dominate  policy 
formation.     
Liberalism “explains policy as a function of the societal  context,  and focuses on how 
domestic conflict, not international anarchy, imposes suboptimal outcomes” (537).
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II. 3. Convergences and Divergence
      Realism and Liberalism
Though Realism and Liberalism assume their actors are rational actors still they are seen 
as opposing theories as they look at the same factors but from different perspectives. The 
basic  unit  of  study for realists  is  the international  system,  whereas  the basic  unit  for 
liberalists  is  the  individual.  Thus,  realists  focus  on  the  macro  level  while  liberalists 
concentrate more on the micro level. The logic driving actors differs between the two as 
realists believe that states seek survival whereas to liberalists units seek maximizing their 
individual  preferences.  The  main  issues  in  studying  politics  for  realists  are  the 
configuration of power capabilities whereas to liberalists the configuration of preferences 
whether economic, social, or what so ever matter most. In studying the changes in any 
status quo, realists focus on state strategies that aim at preserving the national security, 
whereas, liberalists focus on preferences of dominant elite groups within a society as a 
changing mechanism i.e.  realists  believe  that  structures  can only be changed through 
changes in the distribution of capabilities, whereas liberalist believe, that these changes 
could only occur through changes in the intentions and the actions of particular actors. In 
predicting  the  actions  of  units,  realists  study the  variations  in  means  (strategies  and 
capabilities)  while  liberalists  focus  on  the  variations  in  ends  (preferences)  of  certain 
groups or individuals. Motives and ideological nature of certain regimes are also looked 
at differently by each. Realists believe that these do not matter instead states’ strategic 
considerations and their power capabilities matter; on the other hand, liberalists believe 
that the ideological nature of a certain regime and its motives set a state’s preferences that 
are  then reflected in the state’s  actions.  Cooperation between states is  also explained 
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differently by each. Realists focus on uncertainty and configuration of state powers as 
each state tries to enhance its power through allying with other states so they do not 
believe  in  cooperation  as  such  but  in  the  state’s  urge  to  ally  with  other  states  as  a 
necessity  for  surviving  the  anarchic  system.  Liberalists  instead  focus  on  social 
preferences  and  unresolved  domestic  and  transnational  distributional  conflicts  as  the 
basic factors in determining state cooperation for example if two dominant groups in two 
countries happen to share the same preference then the chances for cooperation between 
these  two  states  are  high.  In  defining  power  each  defines  it  from a  different  angle. 
Realists define power in terms of distribution of capabilities while liberalists define it as 
the state’s willingness to use resources according to preference.  
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Chapter two
III. Short History of the Gulf War
Iraq assumed Kuwait to be part of the previous Ottoman province of Basra. However, the 
actual causes of the Iraqi invasion were seen to be linked with the eight-year war with 
Iran than with this  historical  claim.  The war with Iran did not only cause a massive 
number of human casualties, but it also damaged the Iraqi economy and left Iraq with an 
external debt of about 70 to 80 billion dollars (Gazit 8). On the other hand, Iraq was 
furious with both Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for exceeding their quotas 
in producing oil thus causing a fall in the oil prices that definitely did not play to benefit 
Iraq in trying to recover from a war that it claimed it had fought for the sake of all the 
Arab nations. Over and above, Iraq also protested Kuwait’s ‘stealing’ of oil in Kuwait’s 
northern  border  (Ghabra  286).  On  February  1990,  and  in  the  meeting  of  the  Arab 
Cooperation Council, Saddam told the Jordanian King and the Egyptian President to ask 
the Gulf States to forgive him his loans and threatened by saying “Let the Gulf Regimes 
know that if they do not give this money to me, I will know how to get it,” (qtd. In Claes 
107). On July 16, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz presented a memorandum to the 
Secretary General of the Arab League, in which Iraq again accused Kuwait of stealing 
Iraqi oil  by setting up oil  installations in the Rumaila  oil  field.  Iraq also accused the 
United Arab Emirates and Kuwait of exceeding their oil quota at OPEC. A day latter, 
Saddam and in a speech to the nation accused the Gulf States of conspiring with the West 
and threatened to use force to “ensure the restitution of our rights” (qtd. In Claes 108). On 
July  25,  1990,  the  US  Ambassador  April  Glaspie  had  met  Saddam Hussein.  In  this 
particular meeting, Glaspie had told Saddam that the US has “no opinion on the Arab-
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Arab conflicts, like your Arab disagreement with Kuwait” (qtd. In Yousif 62). Latter, 
after six days, Assistant Secretary of State in his speech to Congress said that “The US 
historically takes no position on the border disputes in the area, nor on matters pertaining 
to  internal  OPEC deliberations.”  (qtd.  In  Gazit  19).   On July 31,  Jeddah talks  failed 
between the Iraqi and Kuwaiti representatives (Claes 108). Having failed to convince the 
Gulf States to forgive him his debt and to stick to their OPEC quota and in view of the 
mixed signals that the US gave to Saddam, Saddam ordered his forces into Kuwait on 
August 1990. Within twenty four hours Kuwait was completely occupied. The Kuwaiti 
ruler, Sheikh Jaber al-Sabah and the ruling family and about 300,000 Kuwaitis fled to 
Saudi  Arabia  (Tripp  253).  On  August  8,  Kuwait  was  formally  annexed  to  Iraq  and 
became the nineteenth province of Iraq (Mueller 15).
Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait came after the end of the Cold War and after the US had 
arrived  as  the  only  superpower.  Moreover,  the  Iraqi  occupation  of  Kuwait  in  1990 
marked  the  first  challenge  to  the  US new world  position.  This  action  had  set  a  US 
principle for the new era simply that was “Don’t bully your neighbor” as was said by 
Bush after Iraq invaded Kuwait (Hansen 82).  
The US now awakened by this move, worked towards forming an international coalition. 
Nonetheless, the US relied heavily on the Saudi approval in order to be able to deploy 
and fight from the Saudi land. In order to accomplish this, US Defense Secretary, Richard 
Cheney was sent to Riyadh. By that time, Turkey as well as Syria had had their strong 
stand against Iraq. Moscow had also sided with the US and condemned the Iraqi invasion. 
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The European community had also condemned the invasion and sided with the coalition. 
Even  France  ended  up  siding  with  the  US.  Over  and  above,  the  UN had issued  its 
resolutions against Iraq with a big majority and an absence of a single veto. On August, 
2, Resolution 660 was passed condemning Iraq and demanding its immediate withdrawal. 
Then,  after  four  days,  Resolution  661 imposed  an  embargo  on  Iraq  (Claes  109).  On 
August 25, Resolution 665 was issued and imposed a naval blockade on Iraq. Resolution 
662  of  August  9  had  declared  the  annexation  of  Kuwait  void.  On  November  29, 
Resolution 679 reiterated all the previous resolutions and permitted the use of force in 
case Iraq doesn’t comply and withdraw out of Kuwait (Gazit 23). A meeting between the 
Iraqi Foreign Minster, Tariq Aziz and US Secretary of State, James Baker was held yet to 
no avail. This meeting was initiated by the US president in a way to gather more support 
and to prove to all those that opposed him in the Congress that diplomacy up to its last 
minute  failed.  Twenty-nine  countries  joined  the  coalition  (Gazit  29).  War  started  on 
January 17, 1991. 270,000 person and 1500 tanks went into War that lasted six weeks and 
ended in the death of 100,000 Iraqi soldiers and thousands of Iraqi civilians (Loch 121-
123).     
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Chapter three
IV. Presentation of Hypotheses
After presenting both theories, let us now move to see how these theories can apply to the 
case study presented here. The purpose of this paper is to reach a conclusion about which 
of the above mentioned theories can best explain why the US waged war on Iraq in 1991? 
If we look at Realism, as it is described above, we can derive certain assumptions out of 
this  theory.  First,  Realism  assumes  that  there  is  an  international  system  that  is 
characterized by anarchy. Second, it assumes that the basic units in this system are states 
and that states are said to be equal in the tasks that they perform and rational in that they 
try to adopt the best  strategy that  would enhance their  capabilities  and preserve their 
national interests. Third, the state of nature among these units is the state of war. Fourth, 
these units  differ  in  their  power capabilities  whether  military or economic.  Fifth,  the 
distribution of these capabilities among the units defines the structure of the system and a 
change in the distribution of these capabilities alters the structure of the system. Sixth, 
states tend to flock together in the form of alliances so as to balance a state or other 
powerful states as each unit seeks its survival in a system where its security and national 
interests are seen to be threatened by the other actors in a self-help system. Seventh, the 
structure of the international system is seen to constrain and limit the action of states.  
To study our case study here in terms of these assumptions, the argument becomes that 
the international system in 1989 had faced an alteration in the distribution of capabilities 
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and thus a change in the structure of the international system. In more empirical terms, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union had terminated the bipolar structure that dominated the 
international system during the Cold War. The US had arrived as the only super power 
and thus the new structure of the system is said to be unipolar. 
Within this international system, Iraq had invaded Kuwait and tried to prove itself as a 
regional power. Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait threatened one of the most vital interests of 
the US and that is oil. Moreover, Iraq threatened to become a regional power challenging 
the regional power of Israel. “Iraq had received substantial amounts of financial aid from 
Gulf States, and sophisticated military technology and equipment from the Soviet Union 
and the Western World. Its military supremacy in the Gulf was overwhelming” (Stein 
67).  The Iraqi action also threatened stability in the region which was a long desired 
objective that the US always wanted in order to ensure secure access to oil. 
 
So, according to realists, in order to answer the research question, our focus should be on 
the international structure that prevailed at the time the US decided to go to war. And 
relying on a realist approach, we can predict that the US decision to go to war was a 
function  of  the  international  world system that  prevailed  during that  period.  In  other 
words, two hypotheses may be derived here. First, if the realist approach is right, then the 
US waged this war on Iraq because Iraq had challenged the regional power system by 
occupying Kuwait at the time the US wanted to maintain its privileged position as the 
only superpower that is allowed to make basic decisions that would alter the regional 
system. Second and also based on the realist  assumptions,  the US waged this war to 
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protect  stability  in  the  Gulf  region  and  consequently  the  supply  of  oil  as  a  vital 
commodity needed for the survival of the capitalist and industrial system of the US and 
the maintenance of its superior position.  
 
As for Liberalism, and as described above, the theory consists of three main assumptions. 
First, the basic actors in international politics are groups and individuals that are said to 
be rational and expressive of certain interests that are constrained by differences in the 
level of social influence these groups possess, conflicting ideas or values of these groups, 
and material scarcity. Second, states in defining their preferences act as representatives of 
these groups or individuals. Third, the configuration of state preferences determines its 
actions.
To try and apply Liberalism to our case study here, the main arguments become that the 
US arrived as an economically weakened nation after the end of the Cold War (Rabie 65). 
It invested too much of its savings on the development of Japan and West Germany. It 
also spent too much on its military the fact that weakened its economic ability. Economic 
problems were not the only problems the US faced but also social problems appeared. 
These  weakening  domestic  conditions  could not  absorb another  problem especially  a 
problem relating to oil. American oil companies can not permit Iraq to take the Kuwaiti 
share  of  oil  and thus  decide  on  the  oil  price  inside  the  OPEC.  Neither,  can  the  US 
economy take the blow that might result of OPEC changing its pricing currency from the 
US dollar to any other currency. These risks are far too dangerous for the US economy to 
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take. On the other hand, other groups such as the Jewish Lobby who always supported 
the safe existence of Israel cannot allow through their connections for a state like Iraq to 
threaten to strike Israel in its heartland. 
So, according to liberalism, in order to answer the research question, our focus should be 
on domestic and transnational societal conditions that existed within the US and forced it 
to go to war as well as on social actors. By relying on a liberal analysis, we can predict 
that the US decision to go to war was a function of the US domestic conditions and the 
role played by certain pressure groups towards that end. In other words, our hypothesis 
here becomes that if liberalist approach is right, then the US had waged war on Iraq in 
order to overcome the internal economic crisis. A second hypothesis is that the US waged 
this war as a result of pressure from social groups. And a third hypothesis would be that 
Bush waged this war in order to increase the possibility of his reelection in the coming 
election round.
Yet, our main question remains which of these two theories can best explain the research 
question presented here. In order to arrive at an answer, let us test the above-mentioned 
hypotheses.  In  order  to  test  these  hypotheses,  we  must  test  the  variables  that  these 
hypotheses are composed of. In case of the realist hypotheses, we should focus on the 
characteristics of the international system and how that factor was the determining factor 
for the US to go to war. We should also study the relevance of the oil factor and how 
much  of  the  US  international  policy  was  determined  by  its  dependency  on  oil.  For 
example we could focus on the US policy towards Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as two Gulf 
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States that exported oil.  In the case of the liberal  hypotheses derived from the liberal 
theory we should study the US domestic conditions at the time of the war and see how 
these conditions stimulated the US to wage this war. We should also focus on the role 
played by certain pressure groups towards that end. Is there clear evidence that certain 
groups had their hand in the US decision to go to war or is there not? Was that decision to 
go to war a result of a leadership crisis? Let us now try to answer these questions through 
relying  on two major  groups of authors,  each applying one of the two approaches in 
analyzing the present case study.  
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Chapter Four
V. A Realist Reading
V.1. A Realist Reading of the reasons behind a US war on Iraq in 1991
Realists believe that the “rational core of national interest” (qtd. In Michael Smith 217) as 
E.H. Carr puts it remains at the bottom of any US action. As “For all the talk of a new era 
of international relations following the Cold War, realpolitik continued to be the name of 
the game in the Middle East…those that defied the United States were to be locked in a 
zero-sum struggle with an implacably belligerent foe” (Murden 44). Realists particularly 
perceive this war as a war that the US had to wage in order to preserve its interests in the 
Middle East.  To the realists,  the US can not allow for Iraq to challenge the regional 
balance of power system and thus affect the stability in the region. The US was no longer 
constrained with the cold war and the cold war politics. It arrived as a superpower in a 
new world order. So by trying to analyze the reasons behind the US waged war on Iraq, 
the focus will be, first, on the new world order and how that world system of unipolarity 
shaped US actions in response to regional challenges, second, on the relationship between 
the US and its friendly regimes in the Gulf as a facilitator for the US ‘job’ and to this 
matter the importance of the Gulf states to the US, and third, on the importance of oil as a 
driving factor in this world and how much oil is considered to be vital to the survival of 
the US capitalist system and thus to the US survival and security.
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-   New World Order and Regional Equilibrium:
To tackle the first point, I will first rely on presenting Birth Hansen’s view on how the 
new world system developed and how did it affect the US decision to wage this war. 
Hansen presents  certain  variants  of  the  realist  approach  in  studying  our  present  case 
study.  He outlines a model that focuses on the changes in the international structure and 
how these changes affected the behavior of states. 
Hansen is said to have adopted the realist approach in the sense that he interprets the Iraqi 
issue in terms of the international system that prevailed at that time. He believed that the 
new international structure had its affect on different regions in the world and particularly 
in the Middle East. Hansen based his argument on this variant of Kenneth Waltz: Theory 
of International Politics. According to Hansen’s interpretation the 
Neorealist  theory  provides  a  structural  approach  to  analyze  international 
systems…The theory points to similarities as well as variations of international 
politics, connecting them to the different numbers of great powers in existence. 
Analytically,  the  prevailing  number  of  great  powers  corresponds  to  a  specific 
structure, which induces specific dynamics, and patterns of alignment. When one 
structure is replaced by another, a systematic change takes place and as a result a 
series  of  outcomes  comprising  patterns  of  conflict  and  cooperation  are  to  be 
expected. (Hansen 2) 
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Thus, the new world order that  existed following the Cold War with a change in the 
number of great powers had its affect on patterns of conflict as well as cooperation in the 
world. Though these changes appeared still Hansen assumes that following the Cold War, 
the two assumptions of neorealism basically anarchy and self help still existed to which 
assumptions he based his argument.
Hansen  perceives  that  the  new  world  structure  is  unipolar  and  that  “…unipolarity 
provides only one option, no dominant great power balancing, or no great power alliances 
as in the case of  multipolarity, and  the unipole is in a comparatively privileged position 
to pursue its interests and set the agenda” (Hansen 15).
Hansen studies the new changes in the world structure and comes up with a model for 
studying international relations after the Cold War; this model is what he calls the Model 
for Unipolarity.  New characteristics and terminology were applied by Hansen such as 
flocking,  single  option,  hard  work,  and  the unipole’s  agenda.  By flocking  the  author 
indicated that all states would flock around the unipole. Although all states would fear 
domination and conflict of interest with the unipole, they tend to flock around the unipole 
and to address its agenda as they seem not to have any other choice. Furthermore, in the 
absence of any other great power, these states have only one option of alignment and that 
is an alignment with the unipole or the single remaining great power. The great power on 
the other hand would not fear the competition of another great power and thus it would be 
in a more powerful position. The other states have to work hard as the unipole is not in a 
position of relying on smaller power allies with the vanishing of the zero-sum game and 
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thus these other states should rely on their own capabilities and work hard to protect their 
own interests. Finally, the unipole’s agenda would affect and dominate the international 
agenda in the absence of any other power (Hansen 18-21). As for the other states, he says 
that these states “may take high risks out of fear or because they perceive a window of 
opportunity to obtain long wished for gains while everything is in a mess or because they 
want to prevent others from doing the same” (Hansen 14).
In  summary,  the relationship  between the unipole  and the  other  states  can  be 
characterized  as  other  states’  flocking  (unipolarization)  as  well  as  attempts  to 
avoid dominance and entrapment, the single option, the incentives to hard work 
(towards cooperation as well as conflict), high regional activity, decentralization, 
and the unipole’s quest for facilitating management. The other states will balance 
each  other  in  the  light  of  these  dynamics.  Adaptation  will  prevail  because  of 
functional similarity. (Hansen 68)
As for our case study here, let us now move and try to see how Hansen’s model applies to 
it.  First,  let’s  focus  on  how Iraq’s  occupation  to  Kuwait  was  within  this  new world 
context and how its action caused an alteration in the regional balance of power system. 
Second, how the US reaction to this regional challenge, first by forming the coalition and 
then by waging war was emanating from its assumed role as a world super power. 
Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait was seen to be within the context of the new world structure. 
Iraq lost  the backing and the support  of the USSR with the latter’s  collapse.  “Iraq’s 
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relations  to  the Soviet  Union had loosened,  the Soviet  Union’s  status  as  a  guarantor 
ceased to exist, and its support to Iraq was reduced (bringing about de-alignment); this 
represented a break with bipolar patterns. As a result, Iraq’s position in the subsystem 
was weakened, and a power vacuum appeared as the Soviet Union retreated” (Hansen 
121).
Iraq was left alone to protect its own interests; 
…the single option indeed framed the Iraqi moves in the absence of Iraq’s loss of 
its former asymmetrical alignment and the rivalry between the US and the Soviet 
Union. The invasion also pointed to the presence of the hard work condition. Iraq 
acted in accordance with the expected need of states to care for their international 
position, i.e. security, regionally and at a ground of increased regional activity. 
(Hansen 123)
However, Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait also altered the regional balance of power order. 
By controlling Kuwait, Iraq had expanded its base of oil reserves and had come in border 
with Saudi Arabia. Plus, Iraq’s proved intention of expanding Iraq was perceived as a 
threat  to  its  neighbors that  Iraq was blaming for  its  economic  recession.  “More than 
anything else, considerations of national self-interest and security as interpreted by each 
player – from Turkey to Iran to the US and the USSR, and from Japan to Egypt, Syria 
and Israel – helped explain each series of crisis moves” (Klieman 55). 
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As for  the  US,  it  played  a  leadership  role  and  started  to  organize  the  International 
Coalition and the Operation Desert Shield. The declared objective of the US response 
“was to deter and prevent Iraq from further aggression in the area, against Saudi Arabia; 
and to put strong pressure on Iraq to make it withdraw from Kuwait.” (Hansen 124). 
The Coalition was formed of former USSR allies and other US allies, some countries 
were democracies others were dictatorships. According to Hansen “This broad gathering 
represented a break with the bipolar patterns, symmetrical as well as asymmetrical, not 
least as far as the Middle East subsystem was concerned” (Hansen 125). The participation 
of the Arab states in the Coalition is explained as an act of ‘flocking’ around the ‘single 
option’ that was left after the USSR had left a power vacuum in the Middle East and the 
Arab states could no longer depend on that falling power (Hansen 125). By doing so, the 
small  states  seek  protection  from the  unipole  and looked  for  being  rewarded  by the 
superpower for their alignment. On the other hand, the unipole will respond to challenges 
to its vital  interests  and reassess its allies so as to react to significant  changes in the 
international norms. Hansen quotes Freedman and Karsh, when they implied that “the 
Iraqi invasion was a clear-cut break with the international order, and consequently it is 
not surprising that the international reaction was as strong as it was” (Hansen 138). 
The Operation Desert Storm was consistent with the new structure of the world order. It 
also brought about changes in the area that emanated from a change in the international 
system.  First,  the US as a superpower was directly  involved in the area;  whereas,  in 
previous  times  the  Middle  East  was  used  as  a  proxy  area.  This  position  of  direct 
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involvement came with the consent of nearly all Arab states that on their part joined the 
Coalition  and  latter  the  war.   Second,  the  alliances  pattern  between  Middle  Eastern 
countries shifted from being diverted into radical vs. moderate or conservative camps to 
one that is flocking around a single super power (Hansen 150). 
So according to Hansen the US had ‘deep’ reasons emanating from its new role as a 
unipole to wage war on Iraq that can be summarized as follows:
• The  US  had  decided  to  make  an  example  of  the  Iraqi  case  which  therefore 
provided a long-term political investment.
• Iraq’s WMD-capacity provided the US with a strong incentive to curb this before 
fully unfolded as WMD-capacity demands a more cautious  approach from the 
manager and thereby reduces its policy options
• A WMD-capacity is especially troublesome to the manager if the WMD-state also 
opposes the world order as did Iraq (159).
     
These  reasons  and  the  international  atmosphere  brought  about  the  war.  As  Hansen 
continues by supporting his argument with a neorealist statement as he said “…the Iraq-
US stand-off during the 1990’s is explained by antagonistic positions towards the world 
order. In the case of non-adaptation neorealism points at two possible outcomes: that the 
weaker  part  subordinates  at  last,  or  that  it  will  face  serious  problems,  even  ‘death’” 
(Hansen 159).
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So based on the changes in the international system Hansen sees that our case here can be 
summarized as such; “In the case of Operation Desert Storm, the new alignment patterns 
had distinctly unipolar characteristics as well: the parties flocked around the US, and they 
carried out the US-defined objectives in a US-led coalition even when it came to war” 
(Hansen 160).
The second realist assumption that Hansen adhered to is that states tend to look after their 
own interests that is the self help notion of Waltz. According to him, the US intervened to 
protect  its  interests  basically  stability  in  the  Gulf  and its  needed oil  supplies  from a 
regional power that challenged these interests (Hansen 160). 
However, let us now try and test the oil factor and how much it is needed to US economy 
in order to do so we will start first by presenting the strategic importance of the Gulf 
States. 
- Strategic Importance of the Gulf States:
To Hansen, the second assumption of Waltzian realism that was still valid following the 
end of the Cold War was the self-help notion. Based on this assumption he perceives that 
the US waged this war on Iraq so as to preserve a national interest and in this case its free 
and stable access to the Gulf oil. In order to test this assumption, let us try to see how 
important is the Gulf region to the US and then how important is the Gulf oil to the US 
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capitalist system. To go deeper in our study we will try and see whether or not the supply 
of oil to the US was threatened by this invasion.
o US Relations with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia:
 
The Middle East and particularly the Gulf region is of high importance to the US. It is “a 
region at the juncture of Europe, Africa, and Asia; the heartland of Islam and Judaism; 
and in position of over two thirds of the world’s reserves of oil. The Middle East was of 
such strategic importance that it was difficult to imagine that US leadership in the world 
could exist without a significant degree of control over the region” (Murden 44). 
Historically, the US’s interest in the Gulf had increased during the Cold War due to the 
presence of oil in the region. The US aimed at maintaining stability in the Gulf so as to 
ensure its secure and free access to the oil reserves of the region. Following the withdraw 
of Britain from the Gulf the US, aiming at securing its economic goals, invented the ‘twin 
pillars’ policy that relied on Iran’s power to fill the vacuum that the British had left in 
front of any USSR efforts towards control in the region. The second pillar of this policy 
was Saudi Arabia’s money.  The ‘twin-pillar’ policy aimed at maintaining the region’s 
balance  and it  was guided by Nixon’s Doctrine  on January 1970 (Ghabra 282).  This 
Nixon US policy tried to keep the US away from direct contact in international affairs 
such as what had happened in Vietnam but relied on local countries to do the job with the 
US support and guidance. Nonetheless, with the vanishing of one of the two pillars (Iran) 
following the fall of the Shah and the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan, the US was left 
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with only Saudi Arabia to rely on. Thus, the Nixon Doctrine was replaced by the Carter 
Doctrine in January 1980. This new Doctrine called on the US to use its entire means 
including the military means to prevent any other force but its own from dominating the 
Gulf.  Nonetheless, this did not work out as the US wanted as the general mood in the 
region was anti-Western. This was reflected in the assassination of Anwar Al-Sadat in 
1981,  the  bombing  of  the  US Marines  in  Lebanon  in  1983,  and  the  US shelling  of 
Lebanese and Syrian targets (Ghabra 283).  
Nonetheless, US relations with the Gulf States particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had 
developed based on interests. As for Kuwait, it is considered to be a small country in the 
Gulf. In trying to safeguard its independence in 1961, Kuwait tried to distance itself from 
relations with Britain or the US as both countries were facing too much resentment from 
the Arab states.  Kuwait’s  dilemma as  a  small  country surrounded by Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia dictated on it certain patterns of action that aimed at its survival. Kuwait in the 
early years of its independence was highly supportive of the Arab cause and tried hard to 
maintain its good relations with its surrounding Arab states. Despite that, Kuwait was a 
non-Communist  country  and  most  of  its  economic  relationships  were  with  Western 
countries as a result any collapse in the US dollar would have its affect on the Kuwaiti 
economy. The fact that most of the Kuwaiti money was invested in the US and the West 
made the Kuwaiti position a double standard one. Despite this economic relationship with 
the US Kuwait tried to publicly keep its distance from that country as possible. However, 
with  the  Iran-Iraq  war,  the  Kuwaiti  ties  with  the  US  were  strengthened.  Iran  began 
attacking Kuwaiti oil tankers in 1985 and so Kuwait sought refuge in the US. The US 
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decided to reflag Kuwaiti tankers in July 1987. This marked the first step in US-Kuwaiti 
security cooperation (Ghabra 283). 
The US-Kuwaiti relationship entered a new phase after the invasion of the later country. 
“US fear of a power other than a Western power, or one friendly to the West, controlling 
the region contributed to the US response” (Ghabra 287). 
As for Saudi Arabia, the US interest in that country had begun much earlier before its 
interest in Kuwait. It began in 1933 when King Abd al-Aziz granted an oil concession to 
the  Standard  Oil  of  California  (SOCAL).  This  interest  increased  after  WWII.  Saudi 
Arabia was important to the US because of its oil reserves; a commodity highly needed 
by the US. In 1942-43, the US gave Lend-Lease financial aid to Saudi Arabia after the 
war had terribly affected its two main sources of revenue; the pilgrimage traffic and oil 
production. The US also helped in the formation of the Arabian-American Oil Company 
(ARAMCO). US-Saudi relations were even strengthened more after the announcement of 
the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 that called for the containment of Communism in the 
Middle East.   Saudi  Arabia  remains  one of the most  important  customers  of  the US 
military industry. “The Saudi expenditure per soldier has reached the staggering figure of 
$223,592 annually,” (Ryan 97). The Saudi’s depend highly on the US for support and 
protection in front of both Saddam and the Islamic Iranian Revolution. The Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait increased the fears of the Saudi regime, though there was no evidence of an 
Iraqi attempt to attack Saudi Arabia, and gave it no choice but to accept the presence of a 
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high profile  US military forces  in its  country despite  popular  resentment  to such act 
(Gause 302-306).
Generally, “US and other international interests and involvement in the GCC region are 
likely  to  remain  highly  strategic  and  economic  in  nature  because  of  what  the  GCC 
countries have, where they are, and what they do. They have an abundant supply of vital 
energy;  they lie  astride a  crossroads  between Europe,  Asia,  and Africa;  and they are 
critical not only to the Western alliance but to much of the rest of the world as well” 
(Anthony 375).
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait was an attack on a US friendly country and at the same 
time brought Iraq closer to Saudi Arabia which indirectly threatened the US aims. “The 
United States the world’s largest oil consumer, felt indirectly threatened by the prospect 
of Iraq,  having taken the Kuwaiti  oil  reserves,  being able  to  put political  or military 
pressure on Saudi Arabia” (Claes 108-109).
Being in such a position, Iraq posed a threat to intimidate the region and to manipulate its 
supply of oil which was perceived to be a threat to the US interest in oil and to the world 
economy in general. 
 
At  the  same  time,  the  occupation  of  Kuwait  presented  an  opportunity  to  the  US  to 
enhance its hegemony in the region. 
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It is certainly clear that whoever controls this region and dominate its huge oil reserves, 
estimated to be well over 600 billion barrels, also controls and influences much of the 
world’s energy and financial directions. The US emerging as a victor, undoubtedly saw 
Iraq’s  invasion  of  Kuwait  as  a  god-sent  opportunity  to  further  enhance  its  global 
hegemony. (Abdulla 1) 
o Oil:
In order to proceed further in the realist argument, I will try to check how much oil is 
important to the US capitalist system.
 
In  1943,  Franklin  Roosevelt  sent  the  American  geologist  Everette  Lee  DeGolyer  to 
answer the question “How important are Persian Gulf oil reserves to the future of the 
world?” DeGlover answer when he went back to Washington was that “The center of 
gravity of world oil production is shifting from the Gulf-Caribbean area to the Middle 
East and the Persian Gulf area, is like to continue to shift until it is firmly established in 
that area” (Yergin, 2003).
Following World War II, oil became a strategic commodity needed for the development 
of the capitalist system. Economic growth depended on oil as a substitute for coal. Air, 
water,  land  transportation  all  depended on  oil.  Industry in  general  including  military 
industry  depended  on  oil.  Oil  became  “the  resource  most  essential  to  the  world’s 
economic recovery” (Schneider 17). Dependence on Gulf oil increased as the economic 
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growth meant high level of energy consumption at the time the industrial countries that 
were oil consumers failed to produce alternative energy sources other than oil (Schneider 
49).  
Nevertheless, major industrial countries such as the US feared that western reserves of oil 
are not able of meeting this increase in the demand of this commodity which made them 
look for other resources (Schneider 18). The US government had realized that the Persian 
Gulf is the place where most of the world’s oil is located. However, before and during 
World War II, the British controlled 80% of the Gulf oil; whereas, the US only accounted 
for  15%.  In  Iran  in  1938,  the  British  Petroleum Company  was  the  only  controlling 
company there. In Iraq,  the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) a joint  venture of British 
Petroleum,  Royal  Dutch/Shell,  Campagnie  Francaise  des Petroles,  Exxon, Mobil,  and 
Gulbenkian controlled oil in the whole country. IPC also controlled oil concessions in 
Oman, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi. In Kuwait also the PB controlled a 50% concession. The 
only place were the US companies had a dominant position was Saudi Arabia (18). SoCal 
and Texaco were the two operating US companies in Saudi Arabia during WWII. During 
that time Saudi Arabia faced financial problems due to the halting of hajj pilgrimage and 
the slow development of its oil fields because of the war. The US companies feared that 
this crisis would lead to the fall of Ibn Saud the Saudi King at that time and with him the 
fall of the American concession. Therefore, they pressured Roosevelt to provide Ibn Saud 
with financial aid in return of low prices the US government would get Saudi oil for. At 
first,  President Roosvelt  disagreed and did not support Saudi Arabia directly up until 
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February 18, 1943 when he stated “that the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense 
of the United States” (Schneider 22).      
So the US had realized that it  should “gain control of a resource that was vital to its 
military security, its political power, and its future prosperity.” (19).  Moreover, the US 
was interested in the recovery of Western Europe and Japan and so access to cheap Gulf 
oil would help towards achieving this goal. Also the US would want this commodity in 
building the liberal economic order (Schneider 19).
Over  and  above,  US  oil  production  has  declined  and  therefore  its  dependency  on 
imported oil  has increased.  “In 1970, the US produced about 20% of the world’s oil 
supply, and imported only about 12% of its domestic consumption. Today, it produces 
only about 10% of the world’s oil and imports about half the oil it consumes” (Tanzer 
264). 
To the US, the oil reserves had made the Middle East a target for domination (Bresheeth 
246). 
So to get back to our case study here, having Iraq control Kuwaiti oil makes Saddam in 
control of “one fifth of world’s oil reserves” (Claes 112) is not a situation that the US 
desired specially that its dependency on US oil is high. The US relied heavily on low and 
stable oil prices in order to gain economic advantage over its competitors (Murden 47).
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In short, the US can not permit Iraq or any of the Gulf states to dominate any other state 
and to exert its power and be in a monopolistic position when it comes to oil (Michael 
620).  The US can not allow this  cause “The prize was enormous.  If  successful,  Iraq 
would become the world leading oil power, and it would dominate both the Arab world 
and the Persian Gulf, where the bulk of the planet’s oil reserves in concentrated” (Yergin, 
1991: 22). 
As was shown above the strategic importance of the Gulf States to the US is high and so 
the US would want to use its force and impose its agenda in this area as the only power 
that  is  not  to  be  challenged.  Iraq  came  out  of  its  war  with  Iran  with  an  exhausted 
economy and a debt of $80 billion half of which was owed to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and 
the United Arab Emirates.  However,  Kuwait  refused to forgive Saddam his debt and 
instead it increased its oil production violating its OPEC agreed on quota and causing a 
decrease in the oil prices a situation that Iraq couldn’t take (Bahbah 52). Kuwait even 
used oil from the Rumaila oil field which is practically located in the Iraqi territories. By 
doing this and by overproducing oil, “Kuwait became the tool of a US inspired campaign 
of economic warfare designed to weaken Iraq as a regional power once the Iran-Iraq war 
ended” (Becker 1).
V. 2. General Analysis of the Realist Approach
Arriving as a Super power in world politics, the US was concentrating more on the new 
dialogue with the USSR and the new rising democracies in Eastern Europe. It was more 
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concerned with the new world structure. So all through the events that took place in the 
Gulf, the US was giving mixed signals  to Iraq. The inconsistency in the US position 
towards  Iraq  reflects  the  government’s  lack  of  concentration  on  what  was  really 
happening in the Middle East as it was more concerned with Europe and the new world 
structure.  On Febraury 12, 1990, John Kelly the Assistant Secretary of State with the 
responsibility for the Middle East was received in Iraq and met with Saddam. In this 
meeting Saddam was praised as “a force of moderation in the region, and the United 
States wishes to broaden her relationships with Iraq” (qtd. In Salinger and Laurent 4). 
Three days latter, the voice of America broadcasting to the Middle East broadcasted a 
program that according to this station, it reflected the views of the US government. This 
program called for a mobilization of public opinion against dictators such as the Iraqi 
dictator. Saddam was furious about this and though Washington had sent him an apology 
still that was not enough as on February 21, the State Department had issued a report on 
the violations of human rights in which it dedicated 12 pages to the Iraqi case. Saddam’s 
government was described as “the worst violator of human rights” (qtd. In Salinger and 
Laurent  5).  Latter,  the  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  of  the  House  of  Representatives 
proposed an adoption of a resolution to condemn Iraq to which the Bush administration 
protested against and terminated the adoption (5).
Witnessing this rising tension between the two countries, the US Ambassador to Iraq, 
April Glaspie, sent a message to Saddam, in a meeting hosted by the Iraqi president, 
saying that the US will not take any position in inter-Arab matters and that the US has 
“no opinion on the Arab- Arab conflicts  like your  border disagreement  with Kuwait” 
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(Qtd. In Yousif 62). Though April Glaspie was informed of this meeting only an hour in 
advance and that she didn’t have the time to refer to the State Department (Salinger and 
Laurent 45) and though there is no proof that this view expressed the view of the US 
government still coming from a US ambassador came as encouragement to Saddam. This 
in a way gave the green light to Iraq to enter Kuwait (Niva 56). 
Not only did the US gave ambiguous signals to Iraq but its intelligence agency had news 
of the Iraqi plans to occupy Kuwait long before it happened. “Former CIA officer in the 
Middle East, Miles Copeland, informed BBC Radio that the CIA knew of plans for the 
invasion as early as April or May 1990” (Qtd. In Yousif 65).  However, these news were 
left unnoticed till Iraq took its step and occupied Kuwait.
This act, now that it is real, imposed a great challenge on the US. A country, like Iraq, 
had occupied another country, Kuwait, in an area of high strategic importance at a time 
when the US was said to be a superpower. This shocking incident brought a revival to a 
US plan that considered military intervention in the Gulf ever since the fall of the Shah in 
1979.  President  Jimmy Carter  had  had created  a  deployment  force  whose mission  is 
protecting the oil fields. A secret plan on this with a code number 90-1002 was developed 
at  that  time.  However  that  plan  was  specifically  concerned  with  preparation  for  a 
confrontation with the Soviets in the Gulf (Salinger and Laurent 100). That same plan 
was used as a base for the used in the war against Iraq.  
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Ever  since,  the  US  worked  towards  forming  the  coalition  and  preparing  everything 
necessary for this war including terrorizing Saudi Arabia through spreading news that 
Iraq wants to invade it. The US also sent its Defense Secretary to Saudi Arabia to get 
King Fahd’s approval of the US deployment in Saudi Arabia though the Saudi’s had no 
clue that Iraq had any intention to attack Saudi Arabia as was expressed by King Fahd to 
King Hussein while welcoming an Arab diplomatic solution in the first days of the crisis 
(New York Times, October 16, 1990, qtd. In Becker). The Iraqi act was not easy for the 
US to absorb at a time when it wanted to prove itself that it was worthy of the title it 
acquired following the Cold War. It refused to accept any diplomatic initiative proposed 
by different countries. Several Iraqi proposals were also rejected by the US the first of 
which was on August 12 in which Iraq said that it will withdraw from Kuwait if Syria 
withdrew from Lebanon and Israel  withdrew from West  Bank,  Gaza,  and  the  Golan 
Heights. In August 19, Iraq suggested the replacement of US forces with UN forces and 
to deal with the Kuwaiti issue in a regional context. Another Iraqi proposal was submitted 
to  National  Security  Advisor  Scowcroft  on  August  23  which  suggested  a  full  Iraqi 
withdrawal  from Kuwait  in return of the lifting of sanctions and full  Iraqi control of 
Rumaila oil field (Navi 57-58). Another initiative was the French initiative announced in 
the 45th session of the UN General Assembly meeting to solve the issue in 4 stages (Navi 
61). However all this was ignored by the US and in fact the Los Angeles Times report of 
October 29 revealed that the Bush administration was drafting the timetable for an attack 
on Iraq (Navi 63).
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So in a way the new world structure and the new distribution of power capabilities left 
the US with the ‘policeman role’ to play; a role that realists tend to give to the US. A 
country was erased from the world map without the US consent. This was too great a 
challenge that the US was willing to take. Arriving as a superpower gave the US the 
privilege of setting an agenda that is binding to all, if not, the result would be destruction. 
And this is what the realist theory is about ‘survival of the fittest’. So in the absence of 
any great power, the US will continue to impose its agenda. 
Over and above, the US interest in oil as a source needed for its national security made 
the Iraqi-Kuwaiti issue an issue that can not be dealt with lightly. However, an alternative 
interesting  view  on  the  oil  factor  is  presented  by  Toby  Shelly.  Shelly  stresses  the 
importance of oil in today’s world. The shocks of 1973-74 and 1978-79 exerted a horror 
among the industrialized nations over the control the oil producing countries have of the 
price and availability of oil.  The importance of this  fuel echoed itself  in the call  for 
military intervention to secure its  stable supply.  Nonetheless,  the UN embargo on oil 
from  Kuwait  and  Iraq  in  1990  has  subtracted  in  July  1990,  20%  from  the  OPEC 
production and almost 9% of the global supply. Nonetheless, the world did not in fact 
suffer from a third shock. The reason for this as claimed by Shelly is that “a change in 
industrialized world’s management of its need for oil and thereby its strategic relationship 
with the oil producers of the Middle East” (166).    
Shelly even moves ahead and tries to prove that the West had learnt its lesson from the 
previous two oil crisis and that the too much focus on oil as well as on the economic 
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issues is but a means to cover for the geo-political aim for domination of the Middle East 
by the West. The article claims that oil supply to the major industrialized countries was 
not  threatened  but  to  an  extent  Iraq  may  have  threatened  the  Saudi  Arabian  oil 
production. 
The West reaction to the first and second oil crisis and developments were similar to each 
other; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) established 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) so as to coordinate consumer country defences 
against the oil producing countries, there was a slow down for the demand for OPEC oil, 
an erosion of OPEC’s market share, and a stronger demand for other alternative sources. 
However,  from all  this  an important  lesson was learnt  and that  was that any conflict 
leading to a division of the OPEC countries showed that these countries are happy to 
compensate for the other’s short in production. 
In 1990, the West did not fear an oil crisis as they were sure of the extra production by 
OPEC, the existence of stocks, and the implementation of energy-saving policies. 
The fear of instability in the Middle East had resulted in new energy plans such as the 
one produced in February 1991 by the Bush administration which called for a reduction 
of  dependence  on  imported  oil  from  unstable  regions  and  an  increase  in  domestic 
production (176).
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The reliance on new options such as the access to Soviet gas and the instability in the 
Middle East had caused the West, according to Shelly, to reduce their dependency on the 
Gulf oil. Shelly even goes to say that “even the myth of the oil weapon will be laid to 
rest.” (179).
This alternative argument that mainly assumes that the Gulf crisis had no effect on the oil 
supply to the West as other countries like Saudi Arabia made up for the lost oil presents a 
true argument. It is true that the world did not face a third shock yet still the world’s 
dependency on oil as the main source for energy is also true. Tobby Shelly’s argument 
had weakened the realist hypothesis that assumes that the US had waged this war for oil. 
The fact that the US did not stay and pose its control over Iraq is another issue that needs 
some focus. The US in waging this war had brought back the Gulf into its status quo. So 
a more accurate hypothesis might be that the US waged this war to keep a stable status 
quo in the Gulf so as to secure its flow of oil.
 Despite its ability to explain for some factors, the realist theory was not able to explain 
for other societal and domestic factors that are related to the internal situation of the US 
at the time, the internal political system, the affect of certain people or pressuring groups 
on the US decision to wage war, and the president’s interest in this war. These issues 
were ignored when applying the realist theory to this case study as it doesn’t cover for 
this level of analysis. 
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Chapter Five
VI. Liberalist Reading
VI. 1. Liberalist Reading of the Reasons behind a US war on Iraq in 
1991
Some scholars base their view on why the US waged this war on Iraq on the liberal view 
discussed above. These authors base their analysis on the societal context that pushed the 
US to take such action. Some focus on the economic domestic conditions inside the US at 
that time as the driving force for the US to go to war. Others, study the role of different 
societal actors such as transnational groups or certain people in the US government that 
pushed the US into war. Before presenting this alternative view, it might be useful to start 
by presenting the unique structure in which US foreign policy is made.
- Foreign Policy Making in the US:
Generally speaking there is a view in international relations that perceives the framework 
of the US foreign policy within the domestic context that prevails inside the US.
Within the United States, the domestic context of US foreign policy derives from 
societal forces and the institutional arrangements and structures established by the 
US Constitution.  This  context  makes  societal  forces  –  political  culture,  public 
51
opinion, and group interests and activity – a critical part of the US foreign policy 
arena,  and it  establishes  a complex set  of fluctuating arrangements  among the 
people and institutions of the government. Hence, understanding how US foreign 
policy makers adapt to the issues and problems of the international environment 
first requires a grasp of the societal and institutional settings within which they 
act. (Scott and Crothers 2)
Here,  Scott  and  Crothers,  and  when  speaking  about  the  societal  setting  distinguish 
between the ‘broad societal context’ or the political culture and the societal actors that 
affect  the policy making.  The political  culture that  the Americans identify themselves 
with is ‘democratic liberalism’.  Liberalism refers to the emphasis on the rights of the 
individual and the individual freedom and protection by the rule of law. The economic 
meaning  of  liberalism  is  capitalism.  Capitalism  is  built  on  the  existence  of  the  free 
market,  private  property  and free  enterprise.  The  US is  democratic  in  the  sense  that 
government positions are occupied through elections as well as government decisions are 
reached at through voting. The government is supposed to be accountable to the people as 
it derives its authority from the people. The rights of the minorities are to be respected by 
law. The US is said to be ‘egalitarian’ indicating that citizens should have equal rights 
and equal chances in society. The US is ‘pluralist’ it accepts the decision of the majority. 
It is ‘legalist’ in the sense that the rule of the law is the only prevailing rule. And it is 
universalistic in the sense that it believes that all the above mentioned qualities should be 
empowered in all nations in the universe and that these qualities that might be looked at 
as “the American Way” are a model to be followed by others. 
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When speaking about the societal actors, Scott and Crothers describe the US institutional 
context which basically derives from the US Constitution. Here, the specifics of the US 
Constitution must be noted. The Constitution is accessible and accountable to the public 
and thus allows for the public to pressure the making of foreign policy and at the same 
time  makes  policy  makers  more  sensible  to  appeasing  these  pressure  groups.  The 
Constitution firmly separates between the three powers. Nonetheless, it does not assign 
the task of foreign policy making to any side. Thus the task is distributed between the 
Congress and the executive without giving any part the right to lead. This ambiguity in 
the US institutional framework makes foreign policy an arena open for the influence of 
many domestic forces such as the president, advisors, bureaucracies, Congress, and the 
public. This complexity of the making of US foreign policy makes it an inconsistent one 
as  it  is  produced  and  affected  by  different  internal  pressure  groups  that  are  in  turn 
affected by international factors. 
As Scott and Crothers put it policy emerges from the interaction of three circles. The first 
is the White House. This circle which is headed by the president commands the executive 
branch.  It  has access to the implementation of policy.   The White House can set  the 
agenda,  motivate  the bureaucracy,  and pressure the Congress.  The White  House also 
makes use of the powers mandated to the commander  in chief,  chief executive,  chief 
diplomat, and chief legislator thus giving the president more room to lead policy making. 
The  second  is  the  Foreign  Policy  Bureaucracy.  This  body  comprises  of  the  State 
Department,  Defence  Department,  Central  Intelligence  Agency,  as  well  as  other 
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economic  agencies.  The purpose of this  circle  is  to implement  policy and to provide 
policy alternatives  for decision makers.  However,  the different  agencies  in this  circle 
affect  the  policy  implementation  and  formulation  through  the  disagreement  and 
competition that often prevail in this institution among these agencies. The third is the 
Congress.  This  includes  the leadership as well  as  members  and committees  from the 
previous institutions. The Congress is provided the mandate to legislate, require reports 
and briefings from the executives, advise and consent on treaties. 
The fact that the making of foreign policy is not really associated with any institution 
allows for different decision making forms including those made by the president with 
the aid of his advisors, those done by the bureaucracy, those by the Congress, and those 
by the three together either in the form of interbranch or through subgovernment (alliance 
of subcommittees in the three bodies). Each form depends on the priority of the area 
decided  upon  or  whether  it  is  a  crisis  or  a  routine  situation.  For  example,  decision 
regarding  the  Cuban  missile  crisis  was  taken  at  the  level  of  the  president.  Other 
complications to decision making include the existence of alliance among similar groups 
that belong to different institutions that work towards shaping US foreign policy. Their 
alliance facilitates their access to more information and enforcement of considerations of 
certain  issues as these networks enhance the access to policy making tools to certain 
individuals (Scott and Crothers 1-21). 
To elaborate more on the different US institution, I will move to discuss shortly each 
institution alone.
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The US President is supposed to be the most powerful actor in the US. He occupies many 
roles  such  as  the  role  of  the  commander  in  chief,  the  chief  administrator,  the  chief 
diplomat,  the chief of state and the chief of judicial  office. Nonetheless, the president 
faces  certain  constraints  such  as  time  and  information.  Also  he  faces  institutional 
constraints  by the bureaucracy,  the Congress, local governments,  political  parties, and 
pressure  groups.  Other  factors  also  act  at  constraining  the  president’s  power.  These 
include the press, public opinion, the courts, and the international environment. 
The  struggle  between  the  legislative  and  the  executive  branches  in  the  US,  as  was 
discussed above, also has its affect on the role of the president. Historically speaking it 
was known that at times of war the power of policy making shifts more to the hands of 
the executive i.e. the president. Whereas at times of peace, this power goes back to the 
hands of the legislative i.e. the Congress. Thus, the president’s power grew most with the 
Cold  War  and  with  it  the  American  bureaucracy.  In  1947,  the  Congress  passed  the 
National  Security  Act  which  created  the  National  Security  Council,  organized  the 
military in the Department of Defense, and developed the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). However, following the tragedy in Vietnam things changed. The president faced 
new interest groups and social movements, a more critical press, and a skeptical public. 
His power grew to be more constrained. Ever since Vietnam, presidents found difficulty 
in gathering support around them as Ole Holsti and James Rosenau have said “Perhaps 
the only constancy in American foreign policy since Vietnam has been the conspicuous 
lack of constancy in its conduct” (qtd. In Rosati and Twing 34).                    
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The Foreign Policy Bureaucracy refers to the State Department that is responsible for 
foreign relations; basically its mission lies in formulating and executing the US foreign 
policy, the Central Intelligence Agency that is responsible for collecting, producing, and 
disseminating intelligence, and the Defense Department (the Pentagon) that is responsible 
for protecting the national security (Jones 57-84).        
The US Congress According to Ralph Carter, “Congress was more involved in foreign 
and defense policy making than a study of narrow war powers alone would suggest” 
(108). The Congress was able to use the powers it possessed to answer the president’s 
attempts and policies through compliance, resistance, rejection, or even through drawing 
a  new  policy  on  its  own.  The  powers  it  used  included  legislation,  appropriations, 
ratifications, institutional control as well as informal activities such as policy advocacy. 
Nonetheless, the Congress members are affected by various factors that interfere in their 
making of foreign policy. First, the international system that provided the legislators with 
new threats and opportunities following the Cold War generated disputes on what is/ are 
the best ways to act. Second, societal factors such as public opinion that legislators tend 
to satisfy so as to satisfy their desire of reelection, interest groups that also present the 
legislators  with  more  public  inputs,  mass  movements  that  sometimes  overwhelm 
legislators on a certain issue, and the media that can affect the decisions of the legislators 
and  at  the  same  time  might  be  influenced  by  them.  Third,  institutional  factors  that 
surrounded the  legislators.  These  include  the  president  that  forms  the  context  within 
which the congress acts, the Bureaucracy, party leaders’ members that are in opposition 
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with the president, the standing committees inside the Congress can determine policy by 
authorization  or  funding  in  the  specific  issues,  and  congressional  caucuses  that  are 
informal groups of members that share the same ideas and thus try to push the policy in 
their own desired direction. Fourth, the individual factors that refer to the fact that the 
Congress  is  composed  of  individuals  and  these  individuals  have  their  views  and 
ideologies that respond and are at the same time affected by the above mentioned factors 
(Carter 108-131).
-  US Domestic Situation Just Before the War:
Let me start here by presenting the view of Mohammad Rabie in his book  The New 
World Order: A Perspective on the Post-Cold War Era as he happens to be following the 
liberalist model in his analysis. Rabie presents the US domestic conditions just before the 
war.
According to Rabie, the US was facing a decline in its productivity and business ethics 
(64). By the mid of 1990 the US started suffering from an economic recession (65).  The 
US suffered from “A huge budget deficit, a high trade deficit, a relatively weak dollar, a 
fairly high unemployment rate, an increasing number of institutions and incorporations 
forced  into  bankruptcy  in  the  1980s,  and  about  one-third  of  the  savings  and  loan 
associations have been declared insolvent” (65). In the 1988-91 period, the average of 
yearly trade deficit reached more than $120 billion (66). The budget deficit reached in 
1990 $220 billion (67). Additionally, the US foreign debt in the same year exceeded $900 
billion (69). In trying to solve this crisis, the US started in the 1980s a policy of tax cuts 
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in an attempt to increase savings and to exceed the growth rate. However, the tax cuts in 
the US had led to more spending but did not succeed to increase savings and investment. 
As  a  result,  supply  stood  far  behind  demand  and  the  gap  was  filled  with  imports. 
Dependence on imported goods including imported oil increased to more than 42% of 
consumption in 1990 (70). 
The  shift  in  US preferences  to  give  more  concern  to  its  economic  crisis  had caused 
changes in the US strategy towards the Arab Countries as Moravscik claims that “liberal 
theory provides a plausible theoretical explanation for variation in the substantive content 
of foreign policy.” (534). “The control of more than 60 percent of proven oil reserves by 
a small number of Arab countries would drive the world’s richest most powerful nations 
to try to conclude special arrangements with the oil-rich nations that serve their national 
interests. Moreover, certain nations, particularly the United States, could go beyond the 
establishment  of special  economic relations and into providing military protection for 
some oil-exporting countries,” (51)
Over and above, economic sources inside the US were aware of the fact that any decision 
by the OPEC countries to abstain using the US dollar as the currency for pricing their oil, 
would create a financial disaster to the US.
The  greatest  single  support  of  the  dollar  today  may  be  OPEC’s  policy  of 
establishing  oil  prices  in  dollars.  Should  the  Middle  East  leave  the  American 
orbit,  and the oil  business leave the dollar  zone, the American Century would 
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surely,  quickly  draw  to  an  end.  The  dollar  would  fall  like  a  meteor.  Rich 
Americans  would  move  their  capital  out  of  the  United  States  and  into  safe 
heavens abroad. We would begin to learn what it means to be a soft-money debtor 
in a hard-money world. (qtd. In Rabie 92)
In addition to the internal economic crisis, the US is facing a social and political internal 
crisis. Such problems refer to the trading in drugs, poverty, violence, and crime. In 1990, 
23,600 people were murdered, half of which were killed by people they knew. In the 
same year, 113,000 cases of rape were reported and about 1 million cases actually took 
place.  More  than  1 million  are  in  prisons  and the  homeless  counted  to  more  than  3 
million (76-77).
Based  on  the  above  analysis,  Rabie  reaches  the  conclusion  that  the  deteriorating 
socioeconomic condition at home and the prestigious military image outside had led the 
US to launch its war in 1991 against Iraq (104). Despite the moral justification that the 
US tried to give for this war, Rabie sees its true goal in president Bush’s words when he 
said  “to  protect  the  American  way of  life”  which Rabie  interprets  as  “protecting  the 
supplies of oil from the Gulf” (104) and surviving the tough economic conditions.  On 
November 30, 1990, President Bush also said that “the United States is dealing with a 
dangerous dictator…who desires to control one of the world’s key resources” (qtd. In 
Rabie  104).  The President  also confirmed what  Rabie tried to prove in  this  book by 
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adding that “the United States economy is in a serious slowdown and…if the uncertainty 
remains in the energy market, the slowdown will get worse” (qtd. In Rabie 104).
The CIA funded study “Japan 2000” predicts that the US might not be able to wage a 
new war without the financial and technology support of Japan. For instance, the leader 
of the Japanese right, Shintaro Ashihara,, said that “America could not have won the Gulf 
without  Japanese  money  and  technology.”  (qtd.  In  Rabie  115).  Thus,  the  continued 
weakening of the US economy provoked the United States “to use more of its abundant 
military sticks and less  of its  disappearing  economic  carrots  to  consolidate  its  global 
position and manage world affairs. In fact the new world order enlisted in waging war 
against Iraq in 1991 is one that tends to emphasize the might of military power over the 
logic of military persuasion and economic measures” (Rabie 38-39). This point of view is 
shared  by  Edward  Said  when  he  said  “Today  the  United  States,  triumphalist 
internationally, seems in febrile way anxious to prove that it is Number One, perhaps to 
offset the recession; the endemic problems posed by the cities, poverty, health, education, 
production; and the Euro-Japanese challenge” ( Said 3).
Alan Freeman in his article “The Economic Background and Consequences of the Gulf 
War” supports Rabie’s point of view by taking the same approach in trying to analyze the 
reasons  behind  the  US  decision  to  wage  this  war.  He  starts  by  quoting  Christopher 
Huhne, the business and economic editor of the Independent on Sunday, commented on 
the Gulf War by saying:
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Wars,  once  they  begin,  are  always  fought  for  the  most  noble  of  motives, 
especially by democracies. It is necessary political persiflage to pretend that our 
aims in the Gulf are the defence of the territorial integrity of small nations, the 
better to ensure that aggression never happens again.
The  reality  is  not  so  simple,  as  there  is  an  economic  motive  too.  The  real 
economic  interests  of  the  developed  world  in  ejecting  Saddam Hussein  from 
Kuwait are surely the decisive motive for the war. (qtd. In Freeman 153)
Freeman argues that  “a  competitive  economic  system,  ceaselessly and spontaneously, 
generates economic problems which it can solve by no other means than war, the highest 
form of competition.” (153). The US arrived from World War II as a victorious country 
with a high capital surplus that it devoted to arms and foreign investment while other 
countries invested at home. The US which had been the world’s greatest capitalist has 
become the world’s greatest debtor. But what caused this change? Following WWII, the 
US emerged as a leading industrial country with a capital surplus that it invested in the 
rebuilding of Germany and Japan. The US appeared as having an industrial supremacy, 
capital exports, and a military supremacy. Nonetheless, while the US had used its capital 
surplus in arms and foreign investment, other countries that lost WWII were investing at 
home. Thus the level of productivity was rising higher in these countries than it was in 
the US. The US trade position had also faced a major set back and instead of continuing 
to be a world provider it became a world importer. Freeman claims that “Against this 
economic  background,  the  script  for  the  Gulf  War  was  not  only  already written  but 
proofread, rehearsed and waiting only for the villain and an opening night.” (158). 
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According to Freeman the US wanted to solve its economic crisis through achieving two 
decisive goals in this war. First, the US pushed Saudi Arabia to raise its production from 
5.4bn barrels of oil per day before the war to 8.6bn barrels during the war i.e. fifth of the 
total world’s production. The result of this was that whatever OPEC decides regarding 
the oil prices it becomes in the Saudi Arabia’s hands to determine. This increase in the 
production of oil  helped keep down the price of oil  to less than 20US$ per barrel  as 
compared to what the Iraqis were pushing for which was 25US$ per barrel. The other 
goal was to use the petrodollars of the Gulf to fill its budget deficit rather than have this 
money  go  for  financing  regional  political  problems  such  as  financing  the  PLO  for 
example.  Over  and above,  the  US  would  guarantee  that  its  companies  were  granted 
preference after the war. The International Business Week article entitled “To the Victor 
go the rebuilding contracts” states that
Still-undisclosed agreements between the US and the exiled Kuwaiti government 
specify  that  US  companies  will  get  preference  after  the  war,  according  to 
diplomatic  sources.  After  a  behind-the-scenes  complaint  from  Washington, 
Kuwait  even rescinded the choice  last  month  of  Britain’s  Crown Agents  as  a 
major player in the reconstruction. ‘A very large percentage of contracts is going 
to American companies,’ says Fahd al-Hasawi, the Kuwaiti Minister of State for 
Municipal Affairs in Jiddah, who heads up reconstruction planning. ‘America is 
helping us with all its might and all its children.’ (qtd. In Freeman 162)
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Thus the US wished to solve its economic problem by counting on the reconstruction 
contracts that its companies were favored to sign, by selling more arms that would benefit 
its arms industry,  and by improving the oil balances that would favor its corporations 
(162). The US preference of solving its economic problems determined what the US did 
and that is waging war on Iraq.     
Naom Chomskey, in his observation of the US policy towards the Middle East after the 
Cold War reaches a conclusion that is similar to Rabie’s as he stated
The political leaderships in Washington and London have created economic and 
social catastrophes at home, and have no idea how to deal with them, except to 
exploit their military power. Following the advice of the business press, they may 
try  to  turn  their  countries  into  mercenary  states,  serving  as  the  global  mafia, 
selling “protection” to the rich, defending them against “third world threats” and 
demanding proper payment  for the service.  Riches funneled from the Gulf oil 
producers are to prop up the two failing economies. (87)
These  setbacks  in  the  American  economy  had  nourished  the  US  interest  in  Middle 
Eastern  oil.  Being  in  control  of  that  commodity  would  have  meant  controlling  ‘the 
primary source of energy and in this case giving the US an advantage position it desires 
(Ahmad 15).  
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- Societal Actors:
 
Social forces such as the multinational corporations, political groups, and the media had 
their hand in drawing the US preferences and pressuring the US government into waging 
war against Iraq. US multinational corporations, for instance, had doubled their income 
from foreign operations from 25 percent in the 1970s to 50 percent in the 1980s through 
expanding their  production abroad and marketing at  home.  In a  world atmosphere  of 
growing interdependence and competition, “large corporations and the business elite they 
produced began to develop an attitude that favored manipulative investing, sought cheap 
labor,  and  utilized  economic  power  to  pressure  national  and  local  governments  and 
politicians to extract concessions” (Rabie 55).
To add on Rabie’s point, the international oil companies had a preference in increasing 
their  manipulation  of  the  Gulf  oil  vs  OPEC.  They  were  in  favor  of  the 
‘internationalization’ of oil politics and pulling it from the hands of OPEC. They were so 
much into the weakening of OPEC as an organization that is responsible for setting the 
oil prices and the oil quantities to be produced. In the Petroleum Economist (September 
1990) these companies had set their position:
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, and the political ramifications of the 
landmark  Western  military  involvement  on  Saudi  territory,  have  changed  the 
course of Middle East politics in the most significant manner since the creation of 
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the state of Israel.  Moreover, the end of Kuwaiti independence has called into 
question the efficacy of the entire OPEC system, if not its very existence, and 
radically altered the political disposition of Middle East oil…
The effects of the Western military response to the current situation in the Gulf 
has  been  directly  to  internationalize  the  political  disposition  of  world  oil 
production from OPEC’s most important members. Additionally, it has placed the 
West in the role of primary regional military power in the Northern part of the 
Gulf (qtd. In Tanzer 266). 
    
Moreover,  political  infighting  and  the  manipulation  of  the  system  by  powerful  and 
wealthy interest groups had also aggravated the situation (83). Rabie also stresses the role 
played by certain lobbies such as the Jewish Lobby in pressuring the US government. 
“US conduct  during  the  Gulf  War  of  1991,  which  changed  US priorities  from only 
liberating Kuwait to destroying Iraq’s military power, was not a function of the Western 
quest to control Arab oil only, but also of domestic politics driven by a relentless pro-
Israeli  lobby  to  eliminate  the  Iraqi  military  threat”  (98).  46  out  of  67  Democratic 
members of the Congress voted in favor of the war out of their strong support to Israel 
and their backing by the Jewish lobby (Ahmad, 18).    
  
As for the US media, it had played a great role in selling the Gulf War to the American 
public. It justified and glorified the war. On the other hand it concealed the damage of the 
Iraqi infrastructure as well as the killing of hundreds of innocent people. Even after the 
end of the war, the media drove the world to focus on the Kurds that were forced out of 
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their  homes  and  faced  massacres  after  their  rebel  was  harshly  crushed  by  the  Iraqi 
government. “The US government, which first refused to intervene in the Iraqi domestic 
affairs,  was forced to switch positions  and send its  forces to  occupy large portion in 
northern Iraq and create a “safe haven” for the Kurds” (84). The media in America is 
famous for its ability to concentrate on certain issues and appeal to the public in a very 
strong way that their voice is hardly unnoticed as they stimulate the public to demand 
certain  actions  from  the  US  government.  But  why  would  the  American  media  be 
interested  in  moving  the  public  and consequently  the  US government  to  take  action 
against  Iraq?  Rabie  answers  this  question  by  drawing  certain  conclusions  about  the 
American media. First, big news organizations are huge businesses that make millions of 
dollars every year and billions of dollars in sales. So their interests lie with the business 
community. Second, the people who own the news organizations are integrated with the 
ruling elite (86).
Rabie again states that
US foreign  policy today is  largely a  function  of  domestic  politics  rather  than 
geopolitical  considerations and moral principles. Domestic politics, in turn, are 
subject to election cycles and election politics, particularly the influence exercised 
by special interest groups during election seasons. And since objectives sought by 
such groups are usually contradictory and largely short term, US foreign policy 
has lately been inconsistent, lacking both a strong moral foundation and a clear 
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geopolitical perspective. Nevertheless, the United State’s ability to project power 
around the world seems to have transformed the imperatives of domestic politics 
into rules of international law to be enforced by American power and observed by 
other nations. (106-107)
Certain people surrounding the president had their say in this war as well. Richard Perle 
was advocating a preemptive strike. Henry Kissinger said that “A sharp and short crisis is 
far more in the interest of all concerned with moderation than a long siege” and that the 
“surgical  and progressive destruction of Iraq’s military assets” is  the way to proceed 
(Buchanan 213).
Institutions such as the Pentagon and the military corporations were also pushing for this 
war in what has “been called Pentagon capitalism or the permanent war economy. The 
war against Saddam Hussein showcases weapons smart and dumb, high-tech and low, 
and gives the Pentagon and military contractors a winning argument for new weapons 
systems and new rounds of subsidies” (Darnovsky etal. 481).    
- President Bush, the War, and the Coming Elections:
Edward Smith also follows a Liberal approach in analyzing the reasons behind this war. 
But instead of focusing on a domestic  crisis,  he focuses on a leadership crisis  which 
concealed a leader’s preference. Smith personalizes his assumption by claiming that it is 
67
a personal decision of George Bush to go to war; he even names his book George Bush’s 
War.  Smith refers to a specific meeting following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait that joined 
Bush and Margaret Thatcher as an important event in directing Bush’s mind towards war. 
Before  boarding  his  helicopter  to  Aspen,  Colorado,  where  he  was  supposed to  meet 
Thatcher,  Bush  stated  to  the  reporters  that  “we  are  not  discussing  intervention  [in 
Kuwait]. I am not contemplating such action.”  (qtd. In Smith 64). Thatcher, according to 
Smith, believed that Saddam should be punished. Her views reflected the bitter history 
the Europeans had to undergo in facing Hitler as well as the ties that join her country with 
Kuwait as Kuwait was a British protectorate for more than sixty years. In a joint press 
conference  in  the  afternoon,  Bush  sounded  different  than  he  did  when  he  was  in 
Washington before he had left to Aspen. The president stated that “we are not ruling any 
options in, but we are not ruling any options out” (qtd. In Smith 66), thus leaving space 
for  the  military  option.  “Margret  Thatcher  had  urged  Bush  to  be  “Churchilian”  in 
handling Saddam, and Bush eagerly accepted the challenge…Time magazine, in naming 
Bush Man-of-the-Year for 1990, reported in awe that the president had made his decision 
after leafing through Martin Gilbert’s The Second World War, citing Churchill’s view 
that Hitler should have been stopped in the Rhineland in 1963” (Smith 70). In Smith’s 
words; “Thatcher had ignited his [Bush’s] urge for greatness, and Bush caught fire” (71). 
Smith  focuses  on  Bush’s  personality  and  his  personal  crisis  at  that  moment  as  the 
background for ‘Bush’s decision’. He says that George Bush, had always been accused of 
lacking a moral vision. He was an opportunist. Critically,  Smith claims that Bush had 
found that moral thing to talk about. However, as he says, “Future critics might suggest 
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with some legitimacy that with the November congressional elections looming, the US 
economy  in  the  doldrums,  the  S&L debacle  worsening  daily,  and  his  son  Neil  fast 
becoming the Democrats’ equivalent of Willie Horton, the president seized on the Iraqi 
invasion  of  Kuwait  as  a  needed  diversion…Consciously  or  not,  the  president’s  vital 
interests had become America’s vital interest” (Smith 77).
On going to war, Bush and on August 8, announced his decision to intervene on National 
Television. He said
Iraq  has  massed  an  enormous  war  machine  on  the  Saudi  border,  capable  of 
initiating  hostilities  with  little  or  no  additional  preparation.  Given  the  Iraqi 
government’s  history  of  aggression  against  its  own  citizens  as  well  as  its 
neighbors, to assume that Iraq will not attack would be unwise and unrealistic. 
And, therefore, after consulting with King Fahd, I sent Secretary of Defense Dick 
Cheney to discuss cooperative measures we could take. Following those meetings, 
the Saudi government requested our help and I have responded to that request by 
ordering US ground and air forces to deploy in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (qtd. 
In Smith 97)
Bush’s speech was a fabrication. It was a speech full of “I ‘s”. The decision to intervene 
was according to Bush a response to the Saudi request and their fear of an Iraqi attack. 
Bush knew back then from the CIA and the Defense Intelligence that it was unlikely that 
Iraq would attack Saudi Arabia (Smith 97). 
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Smith asserts that 
George Bush’s concern to counter aggression was a personal feeling that he held 
strongly. It traced partially to his parental upbringing, and in ever larger measure 
to his schoolboy days at Andover. It reflected a romantic warrior ethic that runs 
deep in the values of the American establishment, a culture that prizes athletic 
accomplishment,  martial  virility,  and  moral  certitude.  As  a  child,  Bush  was 
thought to play fair. But he was also taught to punch a bully in the nose…Perhaps 
more important, it reflected what Bush’s boyhood hero, the remarkable Henry M. 
Stimson, would have done (Smith 135-136).
Smith  claims  that  Bush  personalized  the  whole  Iraqi  issue  as  some  kind  of  a 
confrontation between him and Saddam. “Bush was more emphatic. He continued to see 
the conflict as a confrontation between him and Saddam: a rerun of an old Western movie 
with George Bush leading the sheriff’s posse.” (Smith 232). Smith continues that “To 
pick a fight with Saddam, as Bush was doing, and to personalize it to the extent he did, 
strongly suggested a pressing need to prove himself as president” (234).
To prove his point Smith relies on the fact that Bush did not inform the Congress or the 
American people of the military option while crossing out all other options up until eight 
days after he signed his presidential order; “Bush discarded economic sanctions and, over 
the  visible  reluctance  of  the  military  high  command,  selected  war  as  the  preferable 
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option. That, too, was disguised. Not until eight days after signing the presidential order 
doubling the size of Central Command did Bush inform the Congress and the American 
people” (Smith 255).
Smith focuses also on the role of some close personnel  such as the National Security 
advisor, Scowcroft who “Like Bush … looked on the use of force as an option that was 
always available to policymakers, and he deplored the tendency of the American military 
to shy away from potential hostilities. “Can the United States use force-even go to war-
for  carefully  defined  national  interests,  or  do we have to  have a  moral  crusade or  a 
galvanizing  event  like  Pearl  Harbor?””  (Smith  175).  John Sununu,  the  chief  of  staff 
stressed  “the  electoral  advantages  of  a  quick  military  campaign  against  Saddam.  A 
victorious war, he told the press throughout the autumn, would make Bush unbeatable in 
1992” (Smith 175). Vice President Quayle & Defense Secretary Cheney; “Quayle…was 
busy cultivating the Israeli lobby, hoping to remain on the GOP ticket in 1992. Cheney, 
for his  own political  future,  and perhaps aiming at  a slot  on the 1992 ticket,  saw no 
reason to oppose the president, and continually prodded the Pentagon to provide viable 
military options” (Smith 175).
All in all, Smith criticizes the war and blames it all on Bush; it was his decision to go to 
war.
America’s forty-three day war with Iraq was fought to punish aggression. It was 
also fought to destroy Iraq’s military potential. It may have been fought to remove 
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Saddam Hussein  from power.  Certainly it  was  fought  because president  Bush 
decided there was no other option. The United Nations sanctioned the conflict, 
Congress  approved it,  and the  American  people  supported  it.  But  in  the final 
analysis, this was George Bush’s war, (Smith 252)  
Smith’s conclusion is that Bush ignored the congress. There was no deep analysis of the 
situation. It was a personal decision to go to war based on what Bush felt is right and 
what mostly suited his electoral need at that time.
In an article on “Presidential foreign policy”, David Barret presents a similar view to that 
of Smith and sheds light on the process of decision making in the US and how certain 
decisions were solely the product of the president and not the congress. Bush decided in 
late October 1990 (without notifying the Congress or the public for some days) that the 
US would be changing its  ‘defensive’  mode into an ‘offensive’  one.  Bush even said 
clearly that he doesn’t need a congressional resolution to permit me to announce war 
(Dumbrell 62-63).
By focusing on Bush’s decision to go to war, it is useful as well to focus on certain issues 
that might have been of influence on Bush’s decision to go to war. The election factor 
becomes of importance as the new presidential elections were due in 1992. The election 
factor was important in speeding things up. “…among the reasons for the President’s 
deciding to bring things to a head in January, getting the United Nations to set a deadline, 
were both economic and political ones; according to this line of thought, the president 
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didn’t want to risk a protracted war in an election year” (Drew 183).  Winning a war and 
liberating a country and ‘doing justice’ might provide the American president with good 
propaganda.  Certain  officials  surrounding  the  US  president  even  admitted  this.  John 
Sanunu, the president’s chief of staff was advocating that a short successful war in the 
Gulf would guarantee Push’s reelection (Drew 183). 
Survey agencies in the US such as the Gallup Poll showed that the approval of Bush’s 
handling of his job as president increased from 64 between Jan. 11-13, 1991 (the week 
before the war) to 89 on February 28, 1991 (after the war). Whereas, and referring to the 
same dates, his disapproval declined from 25 to 8 (Miller 179-180). 
VI. 2. General Analysis to the Liberal Approach
The societal conditions inside the US were a determining factor in the US decision to 
wage this war. Authors were able to present the different internal problems that the US 
was facing, they were able to describe them in numbers such as in the case of Rabie and 
they concluded that this war was done based on this economic background. 
 
Liberalist arguments as mentioned above focus on societal factors as determining factors 
in  world  politics.  The  US was  facing  a  difficult  economic  situation  that  might  have 
pushed towards war. 
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On  the  other  hand,  certain  people  or  pressure  groups  were  shown  to  have  exerted 
influence over Bush’s decision to go to war. Though studying the influences of certain 
people  (actors)  on  Bush’s  decision  is  sometimes  difficult  specially  that,  up  to  my 
knowledge, very few literature targeted this issue. As Drew puts it “It is impossible to get 
inside  a  politician’s  head  and  know what  combination  of  factors-merits,  presidential 
calculations  or  other  long-term  ambitions,  friendships-motivated  him.  The  politician 
himself may not know” (Drew 190). 
Another famous liberalist argument focuses on the president himself. There is always a 
need for reelection and the US elections were due in 1992; a year to go from the Gulf 
crisis. This factor might be a good explanation of why Bush wanted a quick and decisive 
war in the Gulf unlike the American prolonged war in Vietnam. Bush wanted to avoid a 
prolonged war in the year were his concern should be on his election campaign. President 
Bush’s statement on Gulf Crisis on 30 November 1990 as published by the Associated 
Press stated that
In our country, I know that there are fears about another Vietnam. Let me assure 
you, should military action be required, this will not be another Vietnam. This 
will  not  be  a  protracted  drawn-out  war.  The  forces  arrayed  are  different;  the 
position is different; the re-supply of Saddam’s military would be different; the 
countries united against him in the United Nations are different, the topography of 
Kuwait is different, and the motivation of our all-volunteer force is superb. (qtd. 
In Noorani 181)  
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Moreover, the New York Times published an extract  from a national security review, 
from the early days of the Bush Administration, dealing with “Third World Threats”. It 
read: “In cases where the US confronts much weaker enemies, our challenge will be not 
simply to defeat them, but to defeat them decisively and rapidly.” Any other outcome, it 
explained,  would  be “embarrassing”  and might  “undercut  political  support””  (qtd.  In 
Noorani xxii)
So, all in all, Bush was hoping that this war will increase his public support in the next 
presidential  election round in view of the economic crisis  that  he promised earlier  to 
solve  in  his  famous  phrase to  the Americans:  ‘Read my lips—No. New. Taxes’  and 
which he failed to do.
 
Despite its ability to explain for some factors, the liberalist theory, as it is, was not able to 
explain  for  other  structural  factors  that  are  related  to  state  behavior  within  the  new 
international system. This was an issue ignored by the liberalist analysis.
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VII- Chapter Six
Conclusion & Recommendations
As was shown above in the section that dealt with the realist hypotheses, the three factors 
that  the two realist  hypotheses  were based on;  the new world structure,  the strategic 
importance of the Gulf States, and the importance of oil to the US economic survival, 
were discussed in terms of their relevancy to our case study here. First, as for the world 
structure,  it  shifted  from a  state  of  bipolarity  to  a  state  of  unipolarity  as  proved  by 
Hansen. And this system of unipolarity has its own rules that dictated certain actions on 
states.  The  US arrived  as  the  unipole;  yet  Iraq  challenged  the  unipole  and  occupied 
another country in an area of high strategic importance. Second, the relationship between 
the United States and the Gulf regimes especially the historical relationship with Saudi 
Arabia helped to facilitate the US mission in protecting its strategic interests in the area 
and assuming its leadership role. Third, oil was proved to be a vital commodity to the 
survival  of  the  capitalist  system  in  the  absence  or  the  inefficiency  of  other  energy 
resources. 
By studying these factors, I can arrive and say that the US was acting within this new 
world  context  in  an  effort  exerted  towards  keeping  the  status  quo  and  maintaining 
stability so as to ensure cheap flow of oil.
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Also as seen above, the US handling of the Gulf crisis, starting by its rapid diplomatic 
relations to form the coalition, ignoring any Arab, Western, or Iraqi proposals to solve the 
issue peacefully, convincing the Saudi regime of the need for the US troops inside Saudi 
Arabia,  giving  mixed  signals  to  the  Iraqi  government  before  its  invasion  of  Kuwait, 
working towards weakening the Iraqi army as well as economy, can lead us to certain 
answers to our research question as follows:
- The US waged this war for weakening Iraq as a regional power. Iraq had challenged 
the US as the only Superpower, that is believed to be the only one capable of drawing 
world agenda and altering regional power systems, by shifting the regional balance of 
power system in an area of high importance.  
- The US waged this war for achieving and maintaining the status quo in the Gulf to 
ensure its access to the Gulf oil and to exert its power in the region, the US took an 
opportunity to save itself a presence in this vital region and took it in its own hands to 
protect its own interests in the absence of the Soviet military competition.
So by adopting the realist approach and applying it here to this case study we were able 
to arrive at potential answers to our research question here. But what about the liberalist 
theory and how well was it applicable to the same case?
The liberalist theory as applied here focuses on the societal structure rather than on the 
political structure. Societal actors and the domestic situation inside the US become our 
point of concentration i.e. the domestic structure of decision making inside the US and 
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the social and economic situation inside the US become the focus of study in answering 
the research question.
As shown above, the structure of decision making in the US allows for certain groups and 
actors to make decisions in foreign policy.
On the other hand, the US economic and social domestic situation has deteriorated. Based 
on Rabie’s assumption and in trying to answer the question presented here, ‘why did the 
US wage its war on Iraq in 1991?’, one would conclude that the US was left with no 
other option but to use its military power as it was the only power left for the US to rely 
on in solving its economic crisis. As we traced Rabie’s point view earlier we can move 
on and quote him when he states clearly that “The US military intervention in the Gulf … 
was an attempt to remedy some aspects of the economic problem by military means” 
(Rabie 65). The US suffered from “A huge budget deficit, a high trade deficit, a relatively 
weak dollar, a fairly high unemployment rate, an increasing number of institutions and 
corporations forced into bankruptcy, and a stagnant productivity and investment” (Rabie 
65).
So based on this analysis, potential answers to the research question are as follows:
- US waged this  war  on Iraq to  keep oil  prices  low at  the  time  Iraq was working 
towards an increase in oil prices so as to make up for its weak economy after its war 
with Iran.
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-  US waged this war because of recession in its economy. The US wished to use the 
petrodollars to cover up for its budget deficit.
- Bush waged this war to increase his publicity for the coming elections.
- US waged this war on Iraq knowing that its companies would be granted the Kuwaiti 
reconstruction contracts. 
In conclusion, both theories were proven to be applicable to our case study. Once applied 
to this case study they were able to provide potential answers to the research question. 
Applying  two  contradictory  theories  in  fact  helped  us  to  see  a  more  comprehensive 
picture of the same case. As one might conclude that the results each theory arrives at can 
be  seen  complementary  in  the  sense  that  they  are  better  understood  once  brought 
together.  Theoretically,  realism focuses  on the  distribution  of  power among states.  It 
focuses  on the international  structure that  is  said to  be imposing  constraints  on state 
behavior. For realists the internal structure of states is irrelevant. In this case, realism 
only covers for one level of analysis that is the system level.
On the  other  hand,  liberalism focuses  on the  societal  culture  in  which  states  survive 
whether at the domestic or the transnational level.  The most important actors are groups 
and  individuals  that  are  rational  and  happen  to  have  preferences.  These  preferences 
reflect themselves in the strategies taken by states that result in systematic outcomes. In 
this  case,  liberalism is  said to be ‘multicausal’  as it  covers  for the stage of  defining 
preferences.
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This conclusion is explained by two points. First,  as realism happens to focus on the 
international  structure,  liberalism  fills  the  missing  part  and  covers  for  the  domestic 
structure. Second, while realism focuses on the distribution of power and on hard politics, 
liberalism  covers  for  the  distribution  of  preferences  and  on  societal  factors.  Thus, 
applying the two theories in a way gave us a more comprehensive reading of the case 
study. 
To put this again into more empirical terms lets take ‘oil’ as an example. For the realists, 
control of oil is an important commodity for the survival of the US economic system. At 
the same time control oil is important for the US corporations. So the assumption is that 
the US waged war for oil but was it a war for survival as the realists would claim or was 
it a war reflecting a preference of the oil companies? Or was it both? After studying this 
factor  from both  perspectives,  I  was  able  to  arrive  at  more  comprehensive  answers. 
According to the realist interpretation oil is important for the survival of the capitalist 
system. According to liberalist interpretation, the US domestic economic conditions were 
in a recession and the US waged this war on Iraq to keep oil prices low at the time Iraq 
was working towards an increase in oil prices so as to make up for its weak economy 
after its war with Iran. US waged this war on Iraq knowing that its companies would be 
granted the Kuwaiti reconstruction contracts. 
So by looking at the societal as well as the political structures, we were able to arrive at a 
better and more comprehensive understanding of the case study. Societal structures are 
not as easy to pinpoint as the political structure that is more apparent. Therefore, to me 
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trying to apply a liberalist approach was much harder in terms of finding good evidence 
as compared to applying the realist approach and this is what created a challenge in this 
paper.
However,  the  fact  that  both  theories  have proven to  be applicable  to  this  case study 
doesn’t negate that each theory has its faults or to put it in more appropriate words; each 
theory misses out on certain points in its analysis of the case study. Realism, for example, 
and as was discussed above in this chapter, does not cover up for domestic politics or 
does  it  give  any  attention  to  societal  actors  or  the  role  played  by  the  president  for 
instance. The fact that these points have proven to have played such a role in making this 
war happen proves a weakness on behalf of the realist theory as such.
On the other hand, liberalism doesn’t focus on the role played by the international system 
or the relations between states within that system nor does it give any attention to state 
security and self help within the world system. Empirically,  the US acted as the only 
super power in the international system and this had played a role in defining its actions. 
The US had good relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that were based on mutual 
interests. The US depended highly on the Gulf oil for the security of its capitalist system 
and its survival as a superpower. All these points were ignored by the liberalist analysis 
and thus proved a weakness on the part of the liberalist theory.
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As was shown above, a synthesis of both theories gives us a more comprehensive reading 
of the case study. Each theory was proven to be able to cover up for the missing points 
that the other theory, as it is, couldn’t cover for.    
However, this study shows that although the two theories where proven to be applicable 
to the case study and complementary in the sense that once put together they tend to give 
us a better understanding of the case; still, it was perceived that realism is superior to 
liberalism in the sense that authors that presented a realist argument showed better hold 
of all the necessary evidence of their argument. On the other hand, authors that depended 
on liberalism were in most cases lacking the sufficient proof for their argument.  This 
observation could be explained by the fact that liberalism is more demanding in the sense 
that it goes in its analysis deeper than realism as it focuses on societal factors that are not 
usually obvious to the researcher unlike what realism tries to focus on and that is the state 
behavior within the international structure which is usually obvious to all.
Recommendations:
After presenting my study here, I would like to present these plausible recommendations 
for future studies that might include the following:
- An  analysis  of  the  same  case  study  but  through  the  use  of  other  theories  of 
international  relations.  I  would highly recommend Constructivism as I  feel  it  can 
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explain this case in a different and special way. I would also recommend imperialism 
and globalism. 
- A comparison study, based on this theoretical approach, between the US war on Iraq 
in 1991 and in 2003.
- A study that covers the US war on Iraq in 1991 and the Oslo Accords of 1993 as both 
being Post Cold War US contradictory efforts in the Middle East through applying 
theories like Realism vs. Institutionalism.          
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